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In Re: 
George Ronald Wright Case No. 880544-CA 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
and Cross-Respondent, 
vs. 
Westside Nursery, a Utah limited 
partnership, and Darrel Humphries, 
an individual, 
Defendants and Respondents 
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Dear Ms. Ray: 
In response to your letter of January 26, 1989, please be advised 
that there is no statutory or constitutional provision which is 
dispositive of the central issues presented on this appeal. 
We do rely upon the provisions of Rule 65A, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, in disposing of one of the collateral issues 
presented. We have set forth, verbatim, the relevant provision 
of that rule on page 47 of the brief. 
I apologize for not outlining this material in a separate portion 
of the brief as required by Rule 24. However, inasmuch as we do 
not rely upon any provision other than that quoted on 47 of the 
brief, I do not believe that there is any point in amending the 
brief or modifying the addendum which has been previously 
submitted. 
I hope this letter adequately addresses the concerns which you 
expressed in your letter of January 26, 1989. If additional 
modifications need to be made please let me know. 
Respectfully, 
JQUA{QM#*>^-
Gary W. Pendleton 
FILED 
FEB 2 1989 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
GEORGE RONALD WRIGHT, ] 
Plaintiff and Appellant, ] 
vs. ] 
WESTSIDE NURSERY, a Utah ] 
limited partnership and 
DARREL HUMPHRIES, an ] 
individual, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 880544-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the above-entitled court 
by provision of Section 78-2a-3(2)(j), U.C.A. 1953 as amended. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff initiated this action for the purpose of establishing the 
enforceability and terms of a certain exchange agreement. Defendants 
counterclaimed seeking rescission of the contract and damages on a theory of 
fraudulent misrepresentation. Defendant Humphries also sought damages for the 
termination of his employment contract. 
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Prior to trial the district court summarily dismissed Defendants' 
counterclaim to the extent that it sought rescission of the exchange agreement. 
The case was tried to a jury and submitted on special interrogatories. 
The jury concluded that both parties had breached the contracts and also found 
Plaintiff guilty of fraudulently misrepresenting the value of the real estate conveyed 
to Defendants as part of the exchange agreement. 
Judgment was entered on the special verdict. Following the denial of 
motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for new trial, Plaintiff filed this 
appeal seeking reversal of the judgment awarding damages for fraudulent 
misrepresentation and challenging other aspects of the proceedings and resulting 
judgment. 
Defendants cross-appealed seeking the entry of a judgment awarding 
damages for wrongful termination of Defendant Humphries' employment contract 
and seeking reversal of the judgment to the extent that it held Defendants 
responsible for the payment of a certain promissory note executed in favor of a 
third party, Zions Bank. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Does the evidence support a finding that Plaintiff made any statement 
of material fact concerning the value of the subject real property? 
2. Is a statement of opinion regarding the value of real property 
actionable as fraud? 
3. Does the evidence support a finding that any statement made by 
Plaintiff was false? 
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4 .• . • support any 
statement he made regarding the value of the subject real property was in fact 
false? 
5. Does the evidence support a finding that Plaintiff acted recklessly with 
respect lo .111* ' '.l.itrinnnl 1  made legarding tl le value of the subject real property? 
6. Does the evidence suppc^  finding that Plaintiff fraudulently 
cuncealed < 11 w 11i. id 11. il IL11 1 11 »l« it 1 • the subject real property? 
7 Is the principle which requires the elements of fraud to be proved by 
clean 111111 )! ivii icii ig evidei X:M lelniMnl in (Ink 111 lining Ihe sufficiency ol the 
evidence to support the jury's findings regarding fraud? 
8 1 lid 11 if fiistiiir! 1'i 11 in mi ill in (IJSIIHJ in 111 .mm 1111* • jui y tl lat a good faith 
expression of opinion regarding value is not actionable as fraud? 
9 I) tl the iiiisiiMi! i coi'ji'l *J"'! in entering judgmei it 01 1 the verdict where it 
clearly appeared that the jury had included as damages a hypothetical real estate 
i nmnn^mn iivp<-'th"tiri'ii( u »^ *» i> * * *» 1 t»y Defendant* M| U u • subsequent sale of the 
subject property? 
H" n • (Menda i Il" " i1 !1 ! nr Hif i l lnl i . "n 'miindication where he refused 
and failed to render an appropriate accounting? 
11 I1- Defend; in! I (UIII,| liiri". enl'ilie I In luiiihirseiiieiil .il an,1 funds 
borrowed from Zions First National Bank following the issuance and service of the 
lemponin/ Resfivun'nfj (Met ani i nnli" tM M" v. 'Uatise dated Decernl.u .J 
1985? 
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12. Did the district court err in refusing to instruct the jury that Defendant 
Humphries was entitled to indemnification or reimbursement of funds borrowed 
from Zions First National Bank only if Defendant established that the funds were 
actually used for the purpose of discharging Plaintiff's obligations, that the draw 
was authorized by Plaintiff, and that the funds were not withdrawn in violation of an 
order of the district court? 
13. Are Defendants entitled to attorney's fees based upon contractual 
stipulation where the majority of the contract claims were resolved in favor of 
Plaintiff and against the Defendants? 
14. Did the district court err in refusing to exonerate the injunction bond 
filed by Transamerica Insurance Services where the previous rulings of the court 
and the Special Verdict established the enforceability of the exchange agreement 
and Plaintiff's right to the possession of the nursery and where there was never a 
finding made or a judgment entered establishing that any temporary restraining 
order or preliminary injunction sought by Plaintiff was wrongfully issued? 
15. Did the district court err in denying Plaintiff's motion for directed 
verdict, Plaintiff's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and Plaintiff's 
motion for new trial? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
For the sake of clarity, Plaintiff will be referred to as "Wright" and 
Defendants Humphries and Westside Nursery will be collectively referred to as 
"Humphries" unless the context specifically requires a more exact designation of 
the individual defendants. 
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THE CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS 
Wright and Humphries became acquainted in the early summer of 1985 
when Humphries, as (JCIII'MI pditnn iiiinil iruiiHi|iM i if W*istsidt• H I U M I /,, ,/ns 
landscaping Wright's residence in St. George. In the weeks that followed they 
developed a friendship as they began tn ( iso is-: w» iqhVi \n '"ssibfe B< qui,i:ili«>"> «d" 
the Westside Nursery. (1, 75-76, 409-411, 694-695) 
Westside Nursery was a limited partnership with assets consistii ig c f 
inventory (principally plant material), equipment and goodwill. (T. 73, 759-760,834) 
The partners included Darre mphries (45%), Ins Mthpr-in-lrwv (Gilbert 
Barnes)(45%), and James LaVae Smith (10%) '2-75, 628; Defendant's Exhibit 
No. 9) The limited partnership owne< •** leased its bi jsiness 
premises from James LaVae Smith. (T. 73) 
Humphries'former partner, EdWootton, tincl fernntly" sold ins 4fS-pRrcenl 
interest in the business for $20,500. (T. 71-72, 74-75) 
Westside Nursery I lad suffered afinannnl loss each "I lhfj si-, y", i r , ii 
had been in business with losses totaling $183,597. (I 78-79,258-262) The actual 
negative cash flow in the business totaled $206,668. (1 258 262) 
The local K-Mart store had recently opened a garden shop and three of 
Humphries' competitors had recently gone < i ml I business (T RF> B\ 4 17) Wi n jl il 
was convinced that the business would be more successful if it would not compete 
directly with K-Mart and similar establishments and instead offered (tun! niRlcri.il 
which was considered exotic or unusual in the St. George area. (T. 86-90, 411 
418) 
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Despite prolonged negotiations the parties could not come to terms 
regarding the value of the nursery business. (T. 81-84,415-416, 432-433, 701-702, 
710-711) Wright made it clear that he was interested only in acquiring the plant 
material and that the other purported assets of the nursery were of no value to him. 
(T. 658-659, 759-760, 834, 1026) 
The parties began to negotiate the transaction in terms of an exchange 
involving a portion of a 22-acre tract Wright owned in Weber County. (T. 419) 
Wright explained the reason for approaching the transaction as an exchange of 
properties: 
Q. Okay. Were there any other reasons why you didn't determine the 
value? 
A. Yes. Because every time we approached the price, Darrel and I 
suddenly were into disagreement. If we were - as soon as we began 
to say - interpret or exchange ideas in terms of price as opposed to 
value, the negotiations broke down and did so early on at my home. 
And therefore, it was our suggestion that we involve ourself in a trade 
with enough inherent elasticity on either side to accommodate either 
party. Whether his inventory ended up being $28,000 or $35,000 or 
40 or more was not what I was bargaining for, I was bargaining for 
the inventory. Whether my land turned out to be 28,000 or 35 or 40 
was not what he was bargaining for. He was bargaining for those 
two acres1 of land that had the excellent prospect of being developed 
along with my own property. 
(T. 432-433) 
Humphries traveled to Weber County at Wright's expense in August, 
1985. He denied having seen the property on that occasion. (T. 81-83, 428-429, 
674-675, 699-701) 
Initially Wright contemplated trading only two acres for the nursery inventory. Ultimately three 
acres were conveyed to Humphries as part of the exchange. (T. 419, 759) 
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On October 3, 1985, the parties traveled to Weber County for the 
purpose of negotiating the exchange. (T. 91-99, 215-217, 758) They spent the 
night in Wright's home near the 22-acre parcel. The next morning they spent more 
than four hours reviewing and revising the drafts of two written agreements which 
had been prepared by Wright's attorney, Timothy B. Anderson. (T. 94, 420, 435, 
711-712) The first agreement related to the exchange agreement involving the real 
estate and the nursery. (Addendum A; Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1) The second was 
an agreement relating to Humphries' employment as Wright's nursery manager. 
(Addendum B; Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2) 
The parties specifically discussed and included in the written contract 
provisions relating to the payment of a certain promissory note which Humphries 
had executed in favor of Zions First National Bank on January 3, 1985. (T. 366-
367, 477-479) Wright's position throughout the litigation would be that it was 
Humphries' obligation to pay and discharge this note while Humphries would take 
the position that Wright had agreed to assume it. (R. vol.IV, pp. 19-20) 
There is some conflict in the evidence concerning whether the 
agreements were signed before or after the parties and their wives viewed the 
property which was to be conveyed in exchange for the nursery assets.2 (T. 95-
2
 In relating the events surrounding the inspection of the property, Mrs. Humphries stated: 
Q. [BY MR. CHAMBERLAIN] Were you a participant in any of the conversations 
between Darrel and Ron Wright where the value of the property to be exchanged 
was discussed? 
A. Not in the conferences they had. 
Q. Were you on another occasion? 
A. When we were in the vehicle of the car driving around that afternoon looking at 
property. Because I kept nudging Darrel and saying, "Where are we going and 
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96) Regardless of the exact chronology of events, it is apparent that Humphries 
voiced no objection to the exchange when he viewed the property on October 4, 
1985. 
Wright's 22-acre tract is located south of Ogden and approximately 1.6 
miles from Interstate 15. (T. 422) It has easy access to the Interstate via Combe 
Road to Harrison Boulevard, a major artery. (T. 424) 
The property is located south and west of Combe Road and is relatively 
level, the elevation dropping only approximately 10 feet in the 1600-foot length of 
the property. (T. 97-98, 426) The property is covered with tall grasses and there 
are numerous trees in the northerlymost portion which was conveyed to 
Humphries as a part of the subject transaction. (T. 97-100, 426, 447, 949) 
Humphries acknowledged the parcel's striking aesthetic appeal. (T. 97-98) 
The property is bordered on the west and south by residential 
subdivisions which have developed into middle- to upper-income neighborhoods 
where there exists good pride of ownership. A public school and LDS chapel are 
located in the immediate vicinity and streets are paved to the subject property. (T. 
435-439, 471-472, 938-939, 947) 
The adjacent property located north and west of Combe Road is heavily 
wooded and ascends to a bench. (T. 425-426) 
Wright had acquired the 22-acre tract in 1957 in connection with the 
what are we doing?" 
And he said, "We are going to go look at some property we are thinking of trading 
for the nursery." 
(T. 674) 
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acquisition of approximately 350 acres. (T. 425) As the parties approached the 
property on October 4, 1985, he outlined its history for Humphries and his wife. 
Wright related the terms of numerous land sales which he had made in the area 
and pointed out the locations of these properties. A summary of the testimony 
regarding neighboring properties is attached hereto as Addendum C-2.3 
No evidence was introduced which would indicate that Wright had 
recently obtained an appraisal of the property which he proposed to convey to 
Humphries and Wright never represented that the property had recently been 
appraised. Wright did, however, disclose the fact that he had recently mortgaged 
5.93 acres located in the southeasterly end of the 22-acre tract to Sun Capital 
Bank which had loaned him $20,000 per acre. (T. 589-590, 597-600, 661-665; 
Defendant's Exhibit No. 32) 
Humphries conceded that Wright was not obligated to provide an 
appraisal as a part of their agreement and that he was satisfied with Wright's 
opinion regarding the value. (T. 134-137, 735) 
At trial Humphries admitted several times that nothing that Wright told 
him regarding transactions involving the neighboring properties was false. (T. 137-
138, 449-452, 689-690, 775-778) 
As the parties walked the property, Wright disclosed the fact that there 
was no sewer currently servicing the area. (T. 109-111, 436, 715) The homes in 
neighboring subdivision were on septic tanks. (T. 111) Wright indicated to 
Addendum C-1 is a reproduction of Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 5. Addendum C-2 is a reproduction 
of the same exhibit upon which figures regarding the sales prices or mortgage values of the 
neighboring properties have been superimposed together with supporting references to the record. 
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Humphries that he expected sewer to be on line within a year to a year and a half 
and that he intended to develop the property once the sewer was available. (T. 
110-111,715) 
Several options for developing the land were discussed. These included 
merely holding the property as an investment, developing the property as a 
separate subdivision, and waiting and developing the property with Wright once 
sewer was available. (T- 97-98, 106-108, 112-113, 436-438, 594-595, 715-716) 
Humphries recalls some of these conversations: 
And that there would be a sewer ~ something to do with the sewer 
would be coming to the property within the next year to year and a 
half, but if I wanted to develop the ground with him prior to that point, 
I could. He would show me how to develop it because he said, "I 
know all the tricks. I'm a developer. However, it is my 
recommendation that you wait, and we will develop this together in 
a year and a half down the road." 
0"- 715) 
Humphries and his wife both claim that Wright stated the subject three 
acres was worth $30,000 an acre. Humphries testified: 
Q. [BY MR. PENDLETON] And could you tell the jury what was said 
in the automobile about the value of this particular piece of property. 
A. The exact words, I do not recall. Mr. Wright implied to both of us 
that the value of the property would be worth $30,000 per acre. 
Q. He implied that? 
A. From the best of my recollection, that's correct. When I say 
"implied," let me restate that. "You will find the value of this particular 
property to be worth $30,000 an acre." 
(T. 774-775) 
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Once the agreements were signed, the parties went to Great Basin 
Engineering and then on to a local title company where the deeds were prepared. 
(T. 719-720) The same day, two deeds were executed and recorded conveying 
the northwesterly most three acres of the 22-acre tract. (Plaintiff's Exhibit Nos. 50 
and 51) Humphries and his wife were, at their request, designated as the 
grantees. (T. 481-482) 
Upon returning to St. George, Humphries continued in his position as 
manager of Westside Nursery pursuant to the terms of the management 
agreement which the parties had executed. (T. 121-122,752-754) Under the terms 
of this agreement Humphries' salary was established at the sum of $2500 per 
month. (Addendum B) He had been withdrawing a salary of only $1000 per month 
prior to the exchange and his salary as Wright's manager was established with the 
understanding that Humphries would be responsible for his own taxes and 
insurance. (Addendum B; T. 80) 
In early October 1985, Wright began to implement his vision of the future 
of the nursery business. (T. 490-491, 687) In this undertaking he invested 
approximately $60,000 in the business during the following two months. p~. 490-
492) 
THE CONTROVERSY 
Sometime between the execution of the agreements and Thanksgiving 
1985, Gilbert Barnes wanted Humphries to have the Weber County property 
appraised. (T. 134) 
Shortly thereafter one Chad Eskelsen contacted Humphries and began 
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to communicate to him rumors concerning Wright's alleged lack of integrity. (T. 
1015-1016) Humphries became concerned about the value of the property in 
Weber County and after a cursory investigation concluded that he had been 
defrauded. (T. 739-741) 
Humphries contacted Wright and demanded copies of the agreements. 
When he learned that Wright had gone into town for the purpose of making 
photocopies, Humphries took one of Wright's employees with him and literally 
assaulted Wright when they located him at the Washington County Library. Once 
Humphries had stripped them from Wright's hands he then gave the documents 
to the nursery employee who immediately left the area. (T. 139-143, 493-498) This 
incident occurred on December 5,1985. Thereafter, Wright never returned to the 
nursery until he was given possession of the business by court order in March 
1986. (T. 500-501) 
On December 10, 1985, Humphries signed a second promissory note 
in favor of Zions Bank in the amount of $30,000. (T. 991-992; Defendant's Exhibit 
No. 20) 
On the same day, Humphries retained an attorney, Hans Q. 
Chamberlain, with a $500 check drawn on Wright's nursery account. (T. 145-146; 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 53) Chamberlain immediately wrote a letter to Wright advising 
him that Humphries had reason to believe that the Weber County property had 
been misrepresented and that Wright had fraudulently concealed an impending 
building moratorium. The letter indicated that Humphries was willing to confirm the 
contracts and remain at the nursery as Wright's manager if Wright would 
12 
immediately pay the $15,000 note to Zions Bank and deposit sufficient funds in the 
nursery bank account to cover existing overdrafts.4 (T. 801-806, 815-818; 
Defendant's Exhibit No. 69) 
On December 13, Humphries drew $15,000 against the $30,000 note 
which he had executed on December 10. These funds were deposited in the 
nursery account. (T. 991-992) 
On December 18,1985, Chamberlain again wrote to Wright announcing 
that as a result of Wright's failure to comply with the demands of the December 10 
letter, Humphries had repudiated and rescinded the written contracts. (Defendant's 
Exhibit No. 75) 
THE LITIGATION BEGINS 
On December 23 Wright, by and through his attorney, Timothy B. 
Anderson, initiated this action for the purpose of establishing his ownership of the 
nursery business and his right to the possession thereof. (R. vol.I, pp. 1-21A) On 
the same day the district court issued a temporary restraining order which, among 
other things, prohibited Humphries from incurring any further indebtedness in 
Wright's behalf or in behalf of Westside Nursery. (Addendum D; Plaintiff's Exhibit 
No. 3) A copy of this order was served on Humphries on December 26. This 
order was extended from time to time by stipulation of counsel until a hearing on 
The jury would eventually decide that the $15,000 note was Humphries' obligation and its 
findings would further demonstrate that the overdrafts would not have occurred but for Humphries' 
misappropriation of nursery account funds to his own use and his failure to reimburse the nursery 
account for the payment of obligations which he was to assume and discharge under the terms of 
the written agreements. (R. vol.IV, pp. 143-146) 
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the temporary possession of the nursery was conducted in March 1986. (T. 149-
151, 365, Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 3) 
On December 30, 1985, Humphries drew an additional $5,000 against 
the $30,000 note at Zions Bank. On January 8, 1986, he took another $10,000 
draw. Both draws were deposited in the nursery account. (T. 991-992) 
Between December 1985 and March 1986, Humphries consistently 
repudiated the contracts, took the position that he was the owner of Westside 
Nursery and that the exchange and management agreements had been rescinded. 
(T. 186-187, 806-809) In his own words:5 
Q. [BY MR. PENDLETON] "MR. CHAMBERLAIN: I'm not sure I 
understand the question. 
"MR. ANDERSON: I asked him if he told Mr. Smith or 
represented to him that he owned the nursery, rather 
than Mr. Wright, at this point. 
"THE WITNESS: Well, I think -- hey, I don't know. I 
could have, Tim. I could have. I haven't the slightest 
idea. 
If you're asking me in my opinion who owns the 
nursery, as far as I'm concerned, I own the nursery flat 
out. No question about it in my mind at all. I own 
Westside Nursery." 
Was that your statement on that occasion? 
A. Yes. That was my statement as of March the 11th, at that 
particular day. Because I had not been paid from Mr. Wright. 
0". 808-809) 
Following a hearing which was concluded on March 19,1986, the district 
5
 The quoted language is from Darrel Humphries' deposition of March 11,1986, regarding which 
he was questioned at trial. 
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court awarded Wright possession of the nursery pending adjudication on the 
merits and appointed John L Miles, attorney-at-law and certified public accountant, 
to act as receiver. Wright, by order of the court, was required and did post an 
injunction bond in the amount of $50,000 as a condition to his court-ordered 
possession of the nursery pending trial. (R. vol.1, pp. 303-305) The annual 
premium on this bond is $1000. (T. 508) 
Wright promptly discharged Humphries. (Defendant's Exhibit No. 29) 
Humphries demanded and was eventually paid the salary he claimed for services 
rendered from January through March 1986. (T. 810) 
As court-appointed receiver, Miles took possession of the business 
records and requested the assistance of both parties in performing the duties 
imposed upon him by the court's order. (T. 249-250) 
On March 31, 1986, Humphries answered Wright's Complaint and 
counterclaimed seeking, among other things, rescission of the exchange 
agreement and damages for fraud. Humphries specifically alleged the following 
misrepresentations: 
A. That the real property to be conveyed had a fair market 
value in the sum of $90,000. 
B. That the real property to be conveyed was free and clear 
of all taxes and encumbrances. 
C. That the real property could be developed immediately, and 
that there were no restrictions prohibiting development. 
D. That the real property would be conveyed to Westside 
Nursery, a Utah limited partnership. 
E. That the real property to be conveyed was the property 
viewed jointly by Wright and Defendants, and represented by Wright 
as the parcel having numerous trees located upon the same, thus 
enhancing its developmental potential. 
(R. vol.ll.p. 11) 
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Humphries also sought $15,000 in damages for termination of his 
employment contract (R. vol.II, pp. 15-16) 
On September 17, 1986, the matter came on for hearing on several 
pending motions. Following that hearing, the district court made specific findings 
of fact which included the following: 
1. Defendants accepted certain benefits of the October 4,1985 
Agreement for Purchase of Assets and Contract for 
Management Services, specifically, (A) A position as manager 
of the West Side Nursery from October 4, 1985, until plaintiff 
Wright obtained possession of the premises by order of the 
Court on March 25, 1986; (B) Payment of $7,500 for 
managerial services for the months of January, February and 
March, 1986, during which time control of the nursery 
premises was in dispute; (C) Managerial compensation as 
manager for the months of October, November and 
December, 1985; (D) Monthly payment to defendant 
Humphries of a ten per cent (10%) surcharge over and above 
the regular rental payment from defendant Humphries to the 
lessor of the Westside Nursery property resulting in payment 
of over $2,352.00 to defendant Humphries by plaintiff Wright 
since October 4, 1985; (E) Assumtion [sic] by plaintiff Wright 
of the miscellaneous trade accounts of not more than 
$5000.00, as setforth in paragraph 2 E of the Agreement for 
Purchase of Assets; (F) Regular and timely monthly rental 
payment on the West Side Nursery premises to Landlord 
pursuant to the terms of paragraph 8 of the Puchase [sic] of 
Assets Agreement. 
2. Defendant Humphries has received no managerial fee since 
the business changed possession on March 25, 1986. His 
right to managerial compensation after that date remains an 
issue of dispute between the parties. 
3. Acceptance of the benefits under the Purchase of Assets 
Agreement and the Contract for Management Agreement 
shows an affirmation of sufficient terms of the purchase and 
sale of the nursery that defendants have waived their rights to 
seek recision [sic] of the Purchase of Assets Agreement and 
is further estopped from seeking such relief. 
4. Defendants have received real property in Ogden, Utah, 
pursuant to the Agreement for Purchase of Assets and has 
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listed the same for sale by a licensed real estate broker. 
5. Adequate remedies are available at law to satisfy 
defendant's claims herein. 
* * * 
Based upon these findings the district court made the following orders: 
1. Defendants' Counterclaim as to their first Cause of Action 
for Recision [sic] shall be and is hereby dismissed with 
prejudice. 
2. Defendants' Fifth Affirmative Defense based on the theory 
of recision [sic] is dismissed with prejudice. 
3. Any and all defenses or causes of action by defendants 
herein seeking relief under the legal theory of recision [sic] are 
hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
* * * 
(R. vol.ll, pp. 258-262) 
Miles provided his report to the court on November 11, 1986, and was 
released from any further obligation to act as receiver. (R. vol.ll, pp. 258-262) 
Humphries never again viewed the Weber County property after he 
acquired it on October 4, 1985. (T. 100-101) As Humphries explained it: 
Q. [BY MR. PENDLETON] And you've never gone back up there 
since you started this lawsuit to evaluate that property? 
A. No. Because I have no authority to evaluate it. I wouldn't know 
if it was worth $100,000 or 10 million dollars. 
(T. 101) 
He listed it for sale, and notwithstanding the fact that he was engaged 
in a lawsuit wherein he was contending the property was virtually worthless, he 
was able to sell it to a neighboring landowner for $54,700 approximately one 
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month before trial. (T. 840-841, 862-863; Defendant's Exhibit No. 34) 
Meanwhile, Wright continued his development of the portion of the 
property he had retained and eventually obtained approval of its subdivision. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 6) 
While in possession of the business Darrel Humphries paid several of his 
personal obligations through checks drawn on Wright's nursery account. In 
addition to retaining Mr. Chamberlain by use of this account, Darrel Humphries 
paid pre-October 1985 taxes and accounts payable; paid $5,544.75 against the 
obligations incurred in the purchase of his personal vehicles; paid his personal 
health insurance premiums; and paid a $900 check to Ogden Appraisal, all with 
checks drawn on Wright's nursery account. (T. 145-147, 152-161, 227-229; 
Plaintiff's Exhibit Nos. 53, 54, 55, 57, and 58) 
THE TRIAL 
The matter was tried to a jury beginning on April 25,1988. 
Wright presented evidence for the purpose of establishing that he had 
not contracted to assume the January 1985 note at Zions Bank. (T. 366-367, 477-
479) 
The evidence at trial clearly established that Humphries, while employed 
as Wright's nursery manager, had misappropriated money to his own use (T. 145-
147,152-161, 227-229; Plaintiff's Exhibit Nos. 53, 54, 55, 57, and 58); that he had 
borrowed funds from Zions Bank without authorization and in violation of the 
restraining order (T. 511, 520-522, 526, 665-666); and that the need to borrow 
money for business purposes was necessitated only by Humphries' 
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misappropriation of funds (T. 783-799, 858). 
Finally, Wright sought to establish that Humphries had failed to provide 
an adequate accounting and was therefore not entitled to reimbursement of any 
of the funds which he had borrowed and deposited in the nursery account 
following Wright's ouster. 
Miles, the court-appointed receiver, testified that Humphries had failed 
to keep adequate business records. (T. 312-314) Specifically Miles testified that 
Humphries had failed to keep records from which the accounts receivable could 
be accurately reconstructed. (T. 251-252) Humphries' accountant, Grant Tucker, 
testified that ledgers containing that information existed. (T. 888) These ledgers 
were never produced for the receiver. 
Miles also testified that Humphries had told him that no inventory had 
been taken in October 1985. Humphries failed to produce any such inventory for 
the receiver. (T. 318-320) Despite Miles' requests, Humphries also failed to 
provide a per-unit price which would enable the receiver to evaluate the physical 
inventory taken March 25, 1986. (T. 302-305) 
Finally, Miles testified that the nursery accounts payable increased from 
$11,772.86 on October 4, 1985 to $50,492.60 when Wright regained possession 
of the business by court order on March 25, 1986. (T. 255-257) 
Humphries then proceeded with proof on his counterclaim of fraudulent 
misrepresentation. Part of the evidence offered in support of that claim has been 
summarized earlier in this portion of the brief ("THE CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS"). 
The thrust of Humphries' counterclaim lies in Wright's alleged statements 
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concerning the value of the subject land and the fact that on October 15,1985, the 
Weber County commission declared a limited moratorium on all land lying within 
Uintah-Highlands Water and Sewer District. (Addendum E; Defendant's Exhibit No. 
27) 
The sewer servicing the subject property was completed and on line by 
July or August 1987. (T. 937, 975) Furthermore, the evidence clearly established 
that the subject property would have met the requirements of the limited 
moratorium and qualified for immediate development without the sewer. (T. 928-
930, 980) Humphries' appraiser testified: 
Q. [BY MR. PENDLETON] And, in fact, in your report, Mr. Schwartz -
- you report that Mr. Schwartz [Weber County Health Department] 
indicated that in his opinion, percolation tests and other tests would 
prove positive, and building permits could be obtained? 
A. [BY MR. LESTER S. FROERER] Yes. Absolutely. 
Q. And then you talked to Mr. Jay Anderson at the engineering office. 
Mr. Anderson had the same opinion about the perc tests on the 
subject property? 
A. Right. 
(T. 930) 
Humphries attempted to establish fraud arising out of Wright's alleged 
failure to disclose the impending limited moratorium in the area. The only proof 
regarding Wright's knowledge of any pending moratorium is found in Wright's own 
testimony. He testified that he was contemplating the subdivision and 
development of his 22-acre tract and had approached officials of Weber County 
and the Uintah-Highland Water and Sewer District. He was advised that there had 
been complaints about ground water contamination in the area. He was also 
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advised by a deputy Weber County attorney that the health concerns that were 
being expressed were not of sufficient magnitude to justify further governmental 
regulation of the development of the property. (T. 496-498, 551-567) 
Humphries' appraiser, using a developmental approach to value, testified 
that in his opinion the subject three acres had a value of $64,000 on October 4, 
1985.6 Under his first scenario, Froerer assumed that the property would pass 
required percolation tests and would qualify for development without the sewer. 
Froerer's opinion also assumed that the property would be divided into four 
building lots which could be sold for $24,000 each. After subtracting the direct 
costs of development and indirect costs such as interest and sales commissions, 
he calculated the net sales proceeds to be $69,900 which he reduced to "present 
worth" by applying a discount rate of 12 percent. (T. 906-914) 
Froerer was also allowed to state an opinion regarding value based 
upon a second scenario in which he assumed that the property would not qualify 
for development until the sewer was on line and that the sewer would not be 
available to the property for a period of five years. The greatest variable in this 
formula was the reduction to present worth based upon the five-year delay in 
development. Under this scenario his opinion of value was $35,000. (T. 918) 
Wright called an appraiser by the name of Wib Cook who testified, using 
a market analysis approach, that in his opinion the property had a value of $84,000 
on the date of his appraisal in July 1986. He also testified that in his opinion the 
value would have been substantially the same on the date of the transaction, 
6
 This opinion was in fact based upon an appraisal of 2.81 acres. (T. 940-942) 
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October 4, 1985. (T. 962-972) 
Cook testified that part of his initial investigation of the property included 
an examination of tax records which indicated that the subject three acres was 
valued at $134,860 for property tax purposes and its assessed value was 
$104,688. (T. 968) 
During the course of the trial questions were raised concerning the value 
of the inventory which Wright received through the subject exchange. Humphries 
testified that he and an employee named Phil Tyler had inventoried the nursery 
property immediately prior to the exchange. Based on that inventory and in the 
course of their negotiations, Humphries advised Wright that the inventory had a 
value of $60,000. (T. 759-771,779-780) In fact, the written inventory in Humphries' 
possession totaled only $45,911.90. (T. 779-780) 
Humphries nevertheless insisted that he believed the inventory to be 
worth $60,000 and further introduced testimony indicating that he had mistakenly 
understated its value at the time the trade was negotiated. (T. 759-771) 
In support of his claim for indemnification Humphries sought to justify 
borrowing additional funds from Zions Bank on the basis that he was not 
obligating Wright or Westside Nursery but borrowed the funds in his personal 
capacity. (T. 373-374) 
Following the presentation of all the evidence, Wright moved for a 
directed verdict against Humphries on the issues of fraud and indemnification. 
These motions were denied and the case was submitted to the jury by special 
verdict. (T. 1050-1056) 
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THE VERDICT 
The jury determined that the $15,000 note executed by Humphries in 
favor of Zions Bank on January 3, 1985, was Humphries' responsibility and that 
Wright had not contracted to assume the obligation. (Addendum F; R. vol. IV, 
pp. 143-146) 
The jury also found that Wright was entitled to the accounts receivable 
owed Westside Nursery as of October 4, 1985, and that Humphries had 
misappropriated $6,805 of Wright's money for his personal use. Humphries was 
held responsible to pay the accounts payable as of October 4,1985, to the extent 
that said accounts exceeded the sum of $5,000. (R. vol.lV, p. 144) In so 
concluding it was established that Humphries had used $6,772 of Wright's money 
to service accounts payable which Humphries should have paid. (R. vol.lV, pp. 143-
146; T. 1146-1147) 
The jury concluded that Wright should be required to reimburse 
Humphries the funds he had borrowed and deposited in the nursery account 
following Humphries' repudiation of the exchange contract. (R. vol.lV, pp.144-145) 
The jury found that both parties had breached the agreements and that 
Humphries had been damaged in the amount of $15,000 as a result of his 
termination as Wright's nursery manager and should recover $10,000 in attorney's 
fees. (R. vol.lV, pp. 143-146) 
On the fraud issue, the jury by a 6-to-2 verdict concluded that Wright 
had made fraudulent misrepresentations concerning the value of the Weber 
County property. The jury then concluded that Humphries should be awarded 
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$38,582 in damages. This figure was calculated by beginning with the sum of 
$90,000 and subtracting therefrom $54,700 which was the price obtained by 
Humphries in the subsequent sale of the property. The jury then added the sum 
of $3,282 which was in fact a hypothetical six percent real estate commission 
which the jury assumed was includable as an element of damages.7 (R. vol.IV, 
p.145;T. 1147) 
POST-TRIAL MOTIONS 
Following the rendition of the verdict, Wright moved for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict or, alternatively, for a new trial on the issues of fraud 
and indemnification. (R. vol.IV, pp.147-149) 
Wright also argued that the application of well-established principles of 
law to the jury's findings should result in the entry of a judgment of no cause of 
action on Humphries' claim for wrongful termination. Alternatively, Wright moved 
The jury understood the testimony relating to Mr. Froerer's developmental approach to value 
to indicate that a real estate commission was to be included as an element of damages. Note the 
foreman's response to the court's questioning: 
THE COURT: All right. And the other area I'm wondering about is the $38,582 for -
- under the fraud complaint. 
What was the basis of that award? 
[THE FOREMAN]: We subtracted from the sale price of the home, the price that 
the seller would have received. I think one of the appraisers stated that the real 
estate fee was 6 percent, which we thought was low, but that's what we used. We 
subtracted that from the $54,000 and subtracted that from the $90,000, which was 
claimed as the value of the property. 
THE COURT: So it was based on the $90,000 representation and the actual sale 
price of the property principal minus the real estate fee? 
[THE FOREMAN]: The actual sale price less the commission price. 
(T. 1147) 
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for a new trial on the issue of wrongful termination in the event the court were to 
determine that the jury's findings mandated a verdict in Humphries' favor on that 
issue. (R. vol.IV, pp. 147-149) 
Finally, Wright moved for exoneration of the injunction bond filed when 
he took possession of the nursery under court order in March 1986. This motion 
was made on the grounds that the evidence established and the court had 
previously ruled that Wright was entitled to the possession of the nursery. 
Consequently no finding had been made or judgment entered supporting a 
conclusion that the temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction had been 
wrongfully issued. (R. vol. IV, pp. 185-193) 
The district court concluded that the evidence did not justify a verdict in 
Humphries' favor on the wrongful termination claim and further concluded that an 
application of the law to the jury's findings established Wright's justification in 
terminating Humphries' employment. (Transcript of July 12,1988, hearing pp. 10-
11) 
The district court denied Wright's motions for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict and for new trial on the issues of fraud and indemnification and also 
denied Wright's motion to exonerate the injunction bond. (R. vol.IV, pp.249-
251) 
Judgment was entered on the verdict and this appeal was prosecuted 
from that judgment and from the court's denial of Wright's motions for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, new trial, and exoneration of the injunction bond. 
(Addendum G; R. vol.IV, pp.240-248, 252-253) 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Humphries failed to establish a prima facie case of fraudulent 
misrepresentation. Statements regarding value are not as a general rule 
actionable as fraud and the facts of this case do not bring it within any of the 
recognized exceptions to this rule. 
Even if an opinion regarding the value of the subject property is deemed 
actionable, the evidence fails to establish that Wright made any statement 
recklessly or with knowledge that it was false. 
Humphries failed to keep or provide business records which would 
facilitate an adequate accounting of his management of the nursery business and 
should accordingly be denied indemnification. Furthermore, the district court erred 
in refusing to instruct the jury concerning the elements and burden of proof which 
Humphries was required to establish and carry in order to sustain his claim for 
indemnification. 
Humphries failed to establish entitlement to any contractual remedy and 
is therefore not entitled to recover attorney's fees. 
Finally, Humphries suffered no loss resulting from the issuance of the 
order giving Wright possession of the nursery and the injunction bond should be 
exonerated. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
HUMPHRIES FAILED TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF 
FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION. 
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A. 
ELEMENTS OF FRAUD 
The elements of fraud and deceit are well established in the law of this 
jurisdiction. Pace v. Parrish. 122 Utah 144, 247 P.2d 273 (1952) remains the 
leading case and outlines the nine elements of actionable fraud. They include the 
following: 
(1) That a representation was made; (2) concerning a presently 
existing material fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the representor 
either (a) knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly, knowing that he 
had insufficient knowledge upon which to base such representation; 
(5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) that 
the other party acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; (7) 
did in fact rely upon it; (8) and was thereby induced to act; (9) to his 
injury and damage. 
122 Utah at 144-145. 
B. 
STATEMENTS REGARDING VALUE AS FRAUD. 
1. GENERAL RULE 
It is a well-settled general rule that representations regarding the value 
of real property are ordinarily to be regarded only as mere expressions of opinion 
and do not constitute fraud. See generally 37 Am Jur 2d, Fraud and Deceit. 
Sections 112, 113, 119, and 122 (citing authority from the vast majority of the 
American jurisdictions). 
In commenting on the basis for the general rule, American 
Jurisprudence, Second Edition, reads as follows: 
The general rule that fraud cannot be predicated on representations 
as to value is based on the fact that value is largely a matter of 
judgment and estimation, about which men may differ, and it is 
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therefore unlikely that any statement as to value was material in the 
sense that it was an inducing cause of a transaction. Such 
representations can rarely have induced the other party to enter into 
the contract without negligence on his part. It has been declared that 
the extent of supply and demand relative to an article of commerce, 
upon which its value principally depends, is in a great measure a 
matter of opinion, upon which different minds may form different 
conclusions; to deprive the better informed, more enterprising, and 
more cautious party of the benefit of his contract, on account of 
representations, the correctness of which the other party ought to 
judge for himself, would tend more to encourage ignorance, sloth, 
and recklessness than to repress dishonesty. The law does not deny 
its aid in such case because it looks with indulgence upon a want of 
candor and sincerity, but because it will not encourage that indolence 
and inattention which are no less pernicious to the interest of society, 
and will not relieve those who suffer damage by reason of their own 
negligence or folly. 
37 Am. Jur. 2d, Fraud and Deceit. Section 113 (1968). 
The Utah case which appears to be most directly on point is Baird v. 
Eflow Ivn. Co.. 76 Utah 232, 289 P. 112 (1930). In that case the plaintiff sought 
rescission of a contract involving the exchange of real property claiming that he 
had been fraudulently induced to trade his ranch, which he valued at $50,000, for 
the defendant's interest in the Prescott apartments in Salt Lake City. Plaintiff 
complained that the value of the apartment building had been represented to be 
$125,000, subject to an indebtedness in the amount of $75,000. At trial, plaintiff 
produced evidence that the apartment building was only worth $82,000 while 
defendants produced testimony indicating its value at somewhere between $95,000 
and $125,000. At the close of the case, the court refused to submit the matter to 
the jury for determination and dismissed plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff appealed. 
After concluding that plaintiff had failed to produce evidence of an 
alleged misrepresentation regarding actual rents generated in connection with the 
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operation of the apartment building, the Utah Supreme Court turned its attention 
to the issue of whether or not a fraud claim could be maintained where the 
allegations of misrepresentation are limited to opinions of value in the absence of 
proof of any misrepresentation regarding any specific fact upon which an opinion 
of value would likely be based. In affirming the judgment of dismissal, the Court 
announced its adherence to the general rule: 
It is the general rule that misrepresentations as to value do not 
ordinarily constitute fraud, as they are regarded as mere expressions 
of opinion or "trader's talk" involving matter of judgment and 
estimation as to which men may differ. [Citations omitted] 
76 Utah at 238. 
In Chaneyv. Cahill. (App) 11 Ohio L Abs. 472 (1931), the plaintiff traded 
his 200-acre farm for a brick business property in the city of Columbus, Ohio. 
Concluding that he had been defrauded he abandoned the property, refused to 
receive the rent and brought suit to set aside the transaction. He alleged that the 
Columbus property was represented to him as being worth $30,000 to $35,000 
when in fact it was not worth over $15,000 and that the existing leases on the brick 
business property had been made for the purpose of inducing the transaction, 
were not in good faith, and did not reflect the true rental value of the property. 
The Ohio court concluded that there was no evidence that the rental 
value of the city property had been misrepresented and then addressed the issue 
of the disparity in the values assigned to the property: 
While it appears that Chaney has suffered considerable property loss 
by reason of the trade, it is such a loss as frequently happens where 
parties are dealing in property with which they are unfamiliar. Chaney 
was a farmer and when he undertook to deal in city property he was 
probably out of his business element. Cahill had the right to place 
such value on his property as he desired. 
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11 Ohio L Abs. at 473. 
Plaintiff's petition for rescission was dismissed. 
The Court's attention is directed to the recent case of Poison Co. v. 
Imperial Cattle Co.. Mont., 624 P.2d 993 (1981). In Poison, the defendant had 
become obligated to the plaintiff for the sum of approximately $142,000. Following 
lengthy negotiations, the amount of the obligation was liquidated at $55,000. 
Pefendant owned certain property which he represented to be commercial 
property located in "downtown" Kalispell, Montana. This property was to provide 
security for the payment of the agreed settlement. Plaintiff was to receive a copy 
of the property description, title insurance, and a copy of the recent appraisal 
which defendants had allegedly obtained indicating that the Kalispell property had 
a market value of $45,000. 
Thereafter negotiations continued by phone and correspondence and 
approximately three months later plaintiff agreed to accept the Kalispell property 
in payment of $45,000 of the $55,000 settlement. A warranty deed was tendered 
and accepted notwithstanding the fact that the property had never been identified 
for plaintiff. 
Plaintiff then traveled to Kalispell where he contacted a local realtor for 
the purpose of listing his newly-acquired property. At that time plaintiff discovered 
that the property consisted of slightly over one acre of undeveloped ground 
situated directly between a Pacific Power and Light substation and the railroad 
tracks. While there was a narrow corridor leading from the public street along and 
behind the substation to the subject property, the property itself had no frontage 
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on any public road. Furthermore, there existed substantial questions regarding 
legally enforceable access to the property. At its closest point, the property was 
a distance of five blocks from downtown Kalispell. 
Plaintiff engaged an MAI appraiser who appraised the parcel at between 
$1,250 and $8,900, depending upon the resolution of uncertainties regarding 
access. 
Plaintiff initiated an action for fraudulent misrepresentation and from an 
adverse judgment appealed to the Supreme Court of Montana which affirmed the 
trial court noting: 
This Court has long adhered to the rule that statements of opinion are 
pre-eminently subject to the common law doctrine of caveat emptor. 
[Citation omitted] Statements as to the value of property are 
generally considered declarations of opinion and will not constitute 
a proper basis for rescission. [Citation omitted] 
* * * 
The common law provides reasonable protection to purchasers 
against fraud and deceit. However, it does not go to the romantic 
length of offering indemnity against the adverse consequences of 
folly and indolence or a careless indifference to information which 
would enlighten the purchaser as to the truth or falsity of the seller's 
assertions as to value. In such an instance, every person reposes 
at his own peril in the face of another's opinion when he has ample 
opportunity to exercise informed judgment. [Citation omitted] 
624 P.2d at 996. 
Other courts have even gone further in denying relief based upon 
allegations of fraudulent misrepresentation of the value of land. In Eaton v. 
Sontag. 387 A.2d 33 (Maine 1978), the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine reaffirmed 
a precedent which had been the law of Maine for over 100 years when it 
announced that "misrepresentations as to value and quality of land made by the 
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vendor, even though made with fraudulent intent, are not actionable." 387 A.2d at 
37. See generally Am. Jur. 2d, Fraud and Deceit. Section 53 (1968). 
While the court noted that the result would likely be different had a 
misrepresentation of any material fact reflecting upon the value had been made, 
where the only alleged misrepresentations were opinions of value and general 
statements regarding the quality of the real estate, relief would be denied. It is also 
noted that in Eaton, past association between vendors and purchasers as social 
friends for 15 years did not establish a confidential relationship which would have 
required a higher standard of conduct. 
In Frazier v. Southwest Sav. and Loan Ass'n.. 134 Ariz. 12,653 P.2d 362 
(1982), the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed a judgment against defendant 
Southwest Savings and Loan Association entered upon a jury verdict and 
remanded the case to the trial court with directions to enter judgment in favor of 
Southwest. 
Southwest had made a loan secured by 68 lots in a certain subdivision 
located in Scottsdale, Arizona. Later plaintiff became interested in trading some 
unmounted gems for the equity in the subdivision. When the parties met to 
discuss the proposed exchange, Southwest's vice president attended for the 
purpose of obtaining information necessary to qualify plaintiff to take over the loan 
on the subdivision. During the meeting the owners of the subdivision apparently 
made misrepresentations concerning the status of the subdivision and the required 
municipal and state approval. Southwest did not make any misrepresentations 
concerning governmental approval of the subdivision but had appraised the 
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property st $1,020,000. 
Plaintiff then entered into a contract to purchase the subdivision following 
which he attempted, through his real estate agent, to make sales of subdivision 
lots. Unable to sell the lots, plaintiff could not raise the funds necessary to service 
the Southwest obligation and defaulted. Discussion commenced between plaintiff 
and Southwest began discussing the execution of a deed in lieu of foreclosure at 
which time Southwest had reappraised the property downward to $832,000. 
Ultimately plaintiff brought an action for fraud and negligent 
misrepresentation contending that Southwest had made affirmative 
misrepresentations in appraising the property at a value of $1,020,000 and in 
representing to plaintiff that the lot sales would be so good that plaintiff would not 
have to come up with any other money to meet his mortgage obligations. 
The jury found for plaintiff and following the trial court's denial of 
Southwest's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the appeal was 
prosecuted. 
In reversing the trial court and remanding with instructions to enter 
judgment in favor of Southwest, the court of appeals reasoned: 
Mere representations as to value are generally considered 
expressions of opinion and will not support a claim for fraud. 
[Citations omitted] Furthermore, to constitute actionable fraud, a 
representation must relate to a past or existing fact, and cannot be 
based on unfulfilled promises or statements as to future events unless 
such are made with the present intention not to perform. [Citations 
omitted] 
The alleged misrepresentation concerning the appraisal is a mere 
representation as to value, the alleged misrepresentation concerning 
the sales of lots is a statement as to future events. Accordingly, in 
the absence of other alleged misrepresentations, [plaintiff's] action 
for fraud cannot be based on affirmative misrepresentations. 
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653 P.2d at 365-366. 
2. REPRESENTATIONS OF PRICE IN AN ESTABLISHED 
MARKET 
In the district court Humphries correctly argued that misrepresentation 
as to the value of property may constitute fraud where the representation relates 
to the market value of property consistently sold at an established price in a 
recognized market. See generally 37 Am. Jur. 2d, Fraud and Deceit, Section 118 
(1968). This exception to the general rule is recognized in Utah. 
In Beaver Drug Co. v. Hatch. 61 Utah 597, 217 P. 695 (1923), plaintiff 
purchased a certain business in Beaver, Utah. Plaintiff alleged that under the 
terms of the contract, the business was represented as having an inventory of 
stock of merchandise and drugs which "at cost price in Beaver City, would total at 
least $4,000." Plaintiff alleged that this representation was false and untrue and 
that defendant knew it to be untrue because of his long familarity with business, 
the stock therein and the cost thereof. Defendant contended that any 
representations as to value were mere expressions of opinion and not actionable 
as fraud. The Utah Supreme Court agreed with the general statement of law but 
found the case to fall within an exception to the rule: 
This doctrine is unchallenged. However, it has no application in the 
instant case. Representation as to the price of the goods was not a 
mere expression of opinion, but a statement of fact. The statement 
was that the goods would inventory for $4,000.00 and that defendant 
would guarantee the same. [Emphasis added] 
61 Utah at 603. 
On petition for rehearing the Court made the following clarification: 
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Appellant on application for a rehearing erroneously assumes that the 
opinion of the court holds him liable for mere expressions of opinion 
as to value. Such is not the case. Appellant represented that the 
goods would inventory a certain price and that he would guarantee 
the same. 
61 Utah at 605. 
See also Schwartz v. Tanner, 576 P.2d 87 3 (Utal i 197 8). 
Statements regarding the value of personal property sold in recognized 
wholesale and retail niaiktits at puces establist led oi suggested by i i tar lufactui ei s 
or wholesalers are obviously statements of fact rather than mere expressions of 
It is the recognition of the fact that "no piece of land has its counterpart anywhere 
else" llial defTioinblrale;?. ilinh" inadequacy i it teyal inmedies and allows a "ouil in 
equity for specific performance. See generally . , , dri. JUL 2d, Specific 
Performance, Section 1 il 2 (1973), 
111 opposition to Wright's motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict, Humphries nnnlnnrfnd that Wright haul fopiosented that Lhe surrour idling 
property "consistently sold for $30,000 an acre" and that therefore the case was 
brought si|uiiieh n j ,11111" 1 iilllli lhe exception in lhe general 1 ule relating tc 
statements regarding the value of property consistently sold in a recognized 
market. (H •, Ill III , pp.202-203) 
The evidence in fact demonstrated the opposite: the surrounding 
properties had sold al niaikedly div ' •* ^ iepondmjj pi n is location mil 
individual qualities. See Addendum commenting upon transactions 
sell obsei ved: 
Q. [BY MR. CHAMBERLAIN] What amount of dollars did he tell you 
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had been spent? 
A. Different values for different properties. Some, I believe, were 
going as high as $100,000 per acre, is what he explained to me. 
* * * 
(T. 714) 
3. REPRESENTATIONS INTENDED AS STATEMENTS OF FACT 
VS. OPINION 
In response to Wright's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, 
Humphries cited 37 Am. Jur. 2d, Fraud and Deceit. Section 112 (1968) quoting the 
following portion of that section: 
Whether a misrepresentation as to value is merely an expression of 
opinion, or an affirmation of fact or intentional misrepresentation to 
be relied upon, it is generally regarded as a question of fact to be 
determined by the trier of facts. 
The cases cited in support of the above-quoted proposition are clearly 
distinguishable from the case at bar. In each of these cases the party making the 
representations regarding value either had knowledge that their representation 
was false or made the representation in connection with other misrepresentations 
regarding facts which would materially affect the value of the property. 
Wright submitted the following proposed instruction: 
The owner of property who proposes the sale or exchange thereof 
may express his opinion regarding the value of the property, and if 
his opinion is stated in good faith, a discrepancy between that opinion 
and the appraised value of the property is not actionable as fraud. 
(R. vol.IV, p.45) 
Opposing counsel contended that "good faith" was not a defense to a 
claim for fraudulent misrepresentation citing Smith v. Warr. 564 P.2d 77I (Utah 
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some purposes and inadmissible for others and ultimately refused to give any 
iribtiULtiu) ni i i JM nl faith h'diiny that riny attempt t( i instiui 1 m:\iM cciuubt-j rathei 
than enlighten the jury. (R. vol.IV, p.45; T. 448-466, 1057-1060) 
G. 
CONCEALMENT AS FRAUD 
The limited moratorium declared by the Weber County commission has 
received much attention. The only testimony regarding the nature and extent of 
Wright's knowledge regarding any proposed moratorium was provided through 
testimony during which he explained the inquiries he had made of Richard 
Schwartz, Graham Shirra and a deputy county attorney. The evidence is 
unrebutted that Wright was advised that ground water conditions were not serious 
enough to justify further governmental intervention. 
When the limited moratorium was eventually declared it apparently had 
little impact upon the potential development of the subject property. Humphries' 
own appraiser conceded that both Schwartz and Anderson were of the opinion 
that the subject property would meet all of the requirements of the limited 
moratorium and could be developed immediately. 
Humphries acknowledged that Wright had advised him that there was no 
sewer on the property and that Wright expected the sewer to be installed within 18 
months. The sewer was in fact completed approximately 21 months after the date 
of the exchange. 
Humphries contends that Elder v. Clawson. 14 Utah 2d 379, 384 P.2d 
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802 (1963), is instructive. In Elder, plaintiffs sought and were granted rescission 
of a land contract on the basis that defendants1 real estate agent had failed to 
disclose the fact that the land was under quarantine for a noxious weed known as 
Russian knapweed. Under the quarantine, feed produced on the property could 
not be sold or used elsewhere. In that case the district court specifically found 
that (1) the quarantine had been in place for some seven years prior to the date 
of the sale; (2) the defendants and their agent had actual knowledge of the 
quarantine; (3) before the sale defendants1 agent not only failed to disclose the fact 
of the quarantine but also made statements which inferred that the weeds could 
be eradicated;8 and (4) the existence of the weed and the quarantine materially 
affected the economic use of the farm. 
The distinctions between Elder and the instant case are more than 
technical and superficial. First, in the instant case, the limited moratorium had not 
been declared at the time the parties negotiated and executed the subject 
contract. Furthermore, there is no evidence that Wright knew the moratorium was 
pending. Even after the limited moratorium was declared, the testimony clearly 
established that officials of Weber County and other knowledgeable individuals 
held the opinion that the subject property would meet all the conditions of the 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Crockett elaborated on the extent of the conversation 
between defendants' agent and plaintiffs regarding the presence of the weed: 
[Defendants' agent] pointed out the weeds to Mr. Elder and asked him if he knew 
what they were to which the latter replied: "Yes, that is ragweed * * *?" 
[Defendants' agent] replied, 'That is all it is. It is just starting. Get yourself a spray 
can and spray it and you will be done with it." 
14 Utah 2d at 384. 
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moratorium and woiilc! qi mvilif\ i lor immediate development. 
in resisting Wright's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, 
Hui i iphi ies ai gued: 
The fact that [the limited moratorium] was enacted less than two 
weeks after this transaction occurred could, in the minds of the jury, 
could [sic] give rise to an inference that Plaintiff knew more than he 
disclosed at the time of trial, particularly when viewed with the 
circumstances surrounding his abrupt desire to get the closing 
document signed. (R vol.IV, p.208) 
The position taken by Humphries is troubling because it suggests that 
the jury should be allowed to speculate concerning what, if any, additional 
information Wright had concerning the limited moratorium when in fact there is no 
evidence to indicate that there was anything else to be known. Indeed, to suggest 
that the jury should be allowed to speculate on the extent of Wright's knowledge 
and from that conjecture draw a conclusion of fraudulent concealment is to 
suggest an entirely new standard relating to the proof of fraud claims.9 
D. 
KNOWLEDGE OF FALSITY 
The i ecoi cl is absolutely devoid of ai t) evider ice ii idicating Wr igf it 
possessed knowledge of the falsity of any representation made. On the contrary, 
tin* CVIKiiiiLe is untrbtitlful that 
1. At the time of the transaction Weber County valued the subject three 
rrom an ethical standpoint, the position taken by counsel is most disturbing in light of the fact 
that counsel participated in the depositions of Richard Schwartz and Graham Shirra and is fully 
aware of the fact that their depositions contain nothing which significantly contradicted Wright's 
testimony. 
of $104,688. (T. 968) 
2. Wright was aware of a letter of opinion (Defendant's Exhibit No. 32) 
written by Brent Dopp, a Weber County real estate broker, to Ed Sappington at 
Sun Capital Bank stating that in his opinion the 5.39 acres located on the south 
end of the same 22-acre tract had a value of $32,500 per acre. 
3. There is nothing in the record indicating that Wright had recently had 
the subject three acres appraised or received any letter of opinion indicating that 
the property was worth less than $30,000 an acre. 
E. 
RECKLESSNESS AS FRAUD 
Recklessness was the theme most forcefully argued by Humphries' 
counsel in closing. The evidence will not support a finding of recklessness. 
The values placed upon the subject property for property tax purposes, 
the values placed upon adjacent property for commercial loan purposes, and 
Wright's own personal knowledge of comparable sales in the area all indicated a 
value in the neighborhood of $30,000 per acre. 
F. 
THE "CLEAR AND CONVINCING" STANDARD ON REVIEW 
In examining the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's finding 
of fraud, the appellate court should examine the evidence with reference to the 
standard of proof required to sustain such a finding. See generally Northcrest, 
Inc.. v. Walker Bank and Trust Co.. 122 Utah 268, 248 P.2d 692 (1952); Lynch v. 
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MacDonald l,n Utah Prl A?7 36/ P M 4P4 t\m?) Iu In Northcrest supra, the 
Utah Supreme Court defined the term "clear and convincing evidence11 and 
approved flip application nil thaf standan r -
appeal: 
For evidence to be clear and convincing it must be such that there 
is no serious or substantial doubt as to the correctness of the 
conclusion. [Citation omitted] The evidence so satisfied the mind of 
the trial court. His finding should not be disturbed unless we must 
say that no one could reasonably find the evidence to be clear and 
convincing. [Emphasis added] 
122 Utah a 
Lynch, supra, was a fraud case where the finding of fraud was sustained 
or i appeal with tt ie following observation: 
A careful reading of the entire record establishes by clear, satisfactory 
and convincing proof that the respondents were the victims of a fraud 
perpetrated by their coadventurer, Doc MacDonald, assisted by 
Morgan, who knowing all the facts, actively aided and abetted Doc 
MacDonald in the consummation of this fraud. Morgan, therefore, 
was as much guilty as was Doc MacDonald. [Citation omitted] 
Where the findings and judgment are supported by the degree of 
proof mentioned they cannot be disturbed on appeal. [Citation 
omitted] [Emphasis added] 
12 Utah 2d at 43!:! 
The evidence of fraud presented in the instant case is anything but clear 
and . , allegations of fraudulent misrepresentations to 
fraudulent concealment to scienter and recklessness, the evidence falls far short 
ill C'Slablrsliiinij Injnil liny :,ui hi a deyiue as to ininnuj all "senoiib nnH btibstdntidl 
See also Russell v. Larkin. Case No. 870264-CA, an unpublished opinion of the Utah Court 
of Appeals, filed October 25,1988, wherein this Court acknowledged the application of the clear and 
convincing evidence standard in affirming a directed verdict dismissing a complaint alleging 
fraudulent misrepresentation. 
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doubt." 
POINT II 
THE JURY'S DETERMINATION OF THE VALUE OF THE REAL 
PROPERTY IS UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND 
UNFOUNDED IN LAW. 
The jury awarded Humphries the sum of $38,582 on his claim of 
fraudulent misrepresentation. This figure was arrived at by reference to the sale 
price Humphries actually obtained when he sold the property in March 1988. (T. 
1147) There was no evidence indicating that the property had been sold at fair 
market value. "One sale does not make the market." 
To the figure of $35,300 ($90,000 minus $54,700), the jury added the 
sum of $3,282, a figure representing six percent of the sale price, $54,700, 
concluding that the obligation to pay the real estate sales commission should be 
imposed upon Wright. (T. 1147) 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT A JUDGMENT REQUIRING 
PLAINTIFF TO INDEMNIFY DEFENDANT HUMPHRIES ON HIS 
EXECUTION OF THE $30,000 PROMISSORY NOTE IN FAVOR OF 
ZIONS BANK 
The evidence presented at trial clearly demonstrated that the overdrafts 
in the Westside Nursery account in mid-December 1985 were directly attributable 
to the payment of obligations which should have been paid by Humphries. Had 
no further funds been withdrawn from Zions Bank after the initial withdrawal of the 
$15,000 on December 13, 1985, it is obvious that Wright would have had no 
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nothing more than reimburse the account the funds which Humphries was required 
to repay. 
The difficulty in Humphries' position arises out of the fact of the issuance 
ci a tempouiy restraininn order on Decwmlvr l1'!, I9H6, ennniiny hnn tiom 
incurring further obligations for which Wright or the nursery would be responsible. 
Notwithstanding the tact that this cuilei was served upon Humphnies on i i about 
December 26, 1985, he withdrew an additional $15,000 from Zions Bank. 
While it is undisputed that tt iese funds wei e deposited in ito the Westside 
Nursery account, Humphries should be denied indemnification therefor for three 
reasons: (Vj the funds -Attn nrt netossary to (i^f\ obligations which Wright had 
already incurred, (2) the funds were withdrawn from the bank and deposited in the 
Humphries' employer and the court order, and (3) Humphries failed to comply with 
the legitimate requests ot the court-appointed receivei i/vho wau dttempting to 
account for the expenditure of all loan proceeds which accounting could only be 
accomplishes] n/ ,i ronipanson ot me Oefooei - i , i ton iinvonlni,/ HIKI inn Man i 
25, 1986, inventory. 
It must be borne in mind that from nmi-UHCumliei through late Mftnjh, 
Humphries was in possession of the nursery, denying Wright's ownership and any 
c™rocnnnHirii i ~i, * t \Q vVricijiht as his en iployei 
A - a general principle of law, an agent is under a duty to keep and 
r* '-" A oil an account < il all ninuny n 'thai proper t ) " wi lief 1 I le has 
received or paid out on behalf of his principal. If the principal proves or the agent 
admits that the agent has come into possession of money or other property for the 
principal, the agent has the burden of proving that he had paid it to the principal 
or disposed of it in accordance with his authority. See generally Restatement 
Second, Agency. Section 382, Comment e. 
An agent who is disloyal or insubordinate is not entitled to indemnity if 
he knowingly acts without authority and officiously. Furthermore, even if he acts 
in good faith believing that his actions are authorized, he is entitled to indemnity 
only to the extent that the principal has in fact benefited as a result of the agent's 
acts. See generally Restatement Second, Agency. Section 469, Comment d, and 
Section 439, Comment i. Comment i reads in relevant part as follows: 
An agent who, without authority and officiously pays a debt of the 
principal or assumes an obligation on the principal's account is not 
entitled to indemnity although the payment results in a benefit to the 
principal. [Citation omitted] If, however, he acts in good faith 
mistakenly believing that he is authorized or that his principal's 
interest require his action, he may be entitled to indemnity to the 
extent that the principal has benefited, in accordance with the 
principles of restitution. [Citations omitted] 
The evidence clearly established that Humphries knew that his authority 
to incur further debt on behalf of Wright or Westside Nursery had been terminated 
by order of the district court. 
Even if the jury believed that Humphries was acting in good faith, 
mistakenly believing that he was authorized or that Wright's interests required his 
action, his right to indemnity is commensurate with his ability to establish, through 
an appropriate accounting, the extent of the benefit conferred upon his principal. 
Wright requested and proposed numerous instructions advising the jury 
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c V nnicinagtji a n d t in* ex tent 
of Humphries ' burden ^ - - r indemnification1 1 These 
i ns t ruc t ions were- rei . <- . > ] "v,.| IV, pp 16-55, T 1057-
1060) 
Without appropriate instruction tin\ \\n\ *» -"".vr. Ii'if \ »"'il!ifii.il guidance 
concerning the burden Humphries must carry in order to establish the right to 
reimbursement oi II idcrnnitication Oi K:H Huinpl iries established thai the funds had 
been initially deposited into the nursery account the district court in effect shifted 
tho II i i j inltn nit pirni i In ll/nphil II in ipsnlt uu.is Ihdt I Ii in ip l i i iK. nusti i i it his 
employer, his violation of his employer's instructions and the court's order were 
v »ritl ioi; it coi iseqt ler ice 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Attorney's fees are awardable only if authorized by statute or by 
contract. Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730 (Utah 1985); Turtle 
Management. Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc.. 645 P.2d 667 (Utah 1982). if an 
award of attorney's fees is based oi i contract i lal stipulate 
allowed only in accordance with the terms of the contract. Trayner v. Cushing, 
1
 One of the refused instructions read as follows: 
You are instructed that before Defendant Humphries is entitled to seek 
Indemnification for any funds borrowed in connection with his execution of a certain 
promissory note in favor of Zions First National Bank dated December 5,1985, he 
must show that in truth and in fact any funds withdrawn on said promissory note 
were used for the purpose of discharging Plaintiff's obligations, that the draw 
against the promissory note was authorized by Plaintiff, and that the funds were 
not drawn in violation of the order of this court. (R. vol.IV, p.48) 
688 P.2d 856 (Utah 1984); see also L&M Corp. v. Loader. 688 P.2d 448 (Utah 
1984) (contractual provision allowing attorney's fees was not applicable where the 
contract was not subject of litigation). 
The only relevant contractual provision relating to liability for attorney's 
fees is contained in the Agreement for Purchase of Assets (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 
1). Paragraph 10(c) states: 
In the event of any legal action brought by either party for the 
purpose of enforcing performance of any covenant or representation 
hereunder or for damages for breach thereof, the prevailing party 
shall be entitled to recover from the breaching party attorneys' fees 
and costs as shall be determined by the Court. 
Wright succeeded in establishing the enforceability of the subject 
contracts. He obtained a declaratory judgment establishing that he had not 
contracted to assume Humphries' obligation to discharge the January 1985 
promissory note in favor of Zions Bank. He also established his entitlement to 
$13,577 which Humphries had misappropriated in the course of his management 
of the nursery. 
Humphries failed in his attempt to avoid the enforceability of the 
contracts but succeeded in obtaining a money judgment on his claim of fraudulent 
misrepresentation. Whether or not the claim for fraudulent misrepresentation is 
sustained on appeal, this claim does not provide a basis for an award of attorney's 
fees since it falls outside the contractual provision relating to liability for attorney's 
fees. 
It is respectfully submitted that Wright has or should prevail on all issues 
related to the enforcement of the underlying contracts and therefore Humphries is 
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and/or defense of this action. 
POINT V 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING I Hfi HXONE- HA1 ION ()f 
THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION BOND. 
The relevant provisions of Rule 65A, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, read 
as follows: 
Except as otherwise provided by law, no restraining order or 
preliminary injunction shall issue except upon the giving of 
security by the applicant, in such sum as the court deems 
proper, for the payment of such costs and damages as may 
be incurred or suffered by any party who is found to have 
been wrongfully enjoined or restrained. [Emphasis added] 
The injunction bond posted by Wright only provides security fo«" 
injunction bond covers liability only for damages resulting from the operation of the 
inji motion. 
A party applying for relief under Rule 65A is not required to give security 
fi it the payment uf an\,, juili|rrif>nl wlw h may be takei i agaii ist I lit i i or i ar ly tl leory 
His obligation to provide security is limited to costs and damages incurred as a 
Am.Jur.2d, Injunctions. Section 315. Accordingly, liability on the bond does not 
arise, - - - -x . i m 
establishing that the plaintiff was not entitled to injunctive relief. See generally 42 
Ai i i i Jt IF.2d, Injunctions, Section 382 Such a clHcfniination has never ueen inuup 
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in this case and in fact the district court, on November 11, 1986, dismissed 
Humphries' Counterclaim for rescission thus extinguishing any claim for damages 
arising out of Wright's court-ordered possession of the nursery business. 
None of the damages awarded Humphries in this action arise out of the 
wrongful issuance of any court order. Wright has posted a cash supersedeas 
bond in connection with the prosecution of this appeal. This bond provides 
adequate security for the payment of any sum to which Humphries may be 
entitled. 
There is no jusification for requiring the injunction bond to remain in 
force and effect through the pendency of this appeal. Wright is obligated to 
continue to pay a annual premium in the amount of $1,000 while the bond remains 
in force. Furthermore, in the event Humphries takes any action in an attempt to 
enforce the forfeiture of the bond, Wright will incurr liability to his bondsman for the 
payment of attorney's fees and other costs associated with the defense of any 
forfeiture proceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
The value of real property is subjective. It is a matter of opinion. The 
fair market value of property is the price which would induce a willing seller to sell 
and a willing buyer to buy. 
In this case the jury was charged with the duty of determining the value 
of the subject real estate by clear and convincing evidence. Such a finding would 
not only establish the extent of the damages but, under Humphries' theory of the 
case, establish whether or not fraud had in fact been committed. 
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The jjii II y accomplish- ^ „- !" ~ ne 
licensed appraisers and fixing the value based upon the price obtained by an 
ovvnet whi i Iliad demonstrated little interest in IIif- piopenly ami /In A/a in fact 
engaged in litigation asserting its virtual worthlessness. 
An « vvnif i i ill K .ill piopMly inusl ho allowed In btale his good faith i ipmioii 
regarding its value without fear of liability in the event someone disagrees with his 
assessment or .is in this case, the property later sdis at a price below his stated 
opinion. 
Thn llir,iiJ(l " ruin I cannull he sustained ". afhuul exalting consuiiiensm 
above enterprise, cynicism above initiative. 
V /I lile it i nay be easiei foi tl le Coi JI 11 D subi 1 lit to tl le vei diet of a ji iry thai i 
it is to assign reasons why it is unable to do so, it is respectfully submitted that the 
review of the entire record. 
It lis respectfi jlly subr 1 lifted that the judgi i lei it should be reversed and 
remanded with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Wright on the claims of 
fraudulent misrepresentation and! inilnnnilicatii m, no cause ot action 
The judgment should also be reversed to the extent that it awards 
Humphries attorney's tecs and the on lei denying Wughl s mi »fn HI II J exone rate thn 
injunction bond should also be reversed. 
Finally Wilight should rpcnvni Inn, costs and attorney's tees, incuri ed ii i 
- i 
the prosecution of this appeal and in the defense of Humphries' cross appeal. 
DATED this 3^ day of January, 1989. 
13/ 
Gary W. Pendleton 
Attorney for Plaintiff and 
Appellant, George Ronald Wright 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that on this day of January, 1989, I did 
personally mail four true and correct copies of the above and foregoing Motion to 
Hans Q. Chamberlain, Attorney for Defendant at 250 South Main, P. O. Box 726, 
Cedar City, Utah 84720. 
Gary W. Pendleton 
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ADDENDUM A 
/>>/&£- /^ 6r^crncnt 
\) 
>'JJ<^ 
REEMENT FOR PURCHASE Ci" hu*\uui'< i\^^ *-, ~o 
THIS AGREEMENT is entered into as o: .?+<-
» 
u
 te^ieiEi^r, 198 5, by ana betw een WESTSIEE NURSERU, 
c^s^a Par tnership ("Seller"' , and its principal general partner DkRREL 
HUMPHRIES, an individual of \~5Hi,' ijta^/ ("Humphries"), and GEORGE 
RONALD WRIGHT, an individual ("Buyer'), 
RECITALS OF FACT 
A. Seller is a Utah Limited Partnership in the 
business of .operating a nursery in St. George, Utah. the Limited 
Partnership has also improved and maintained certain leasehold 
property used in connection with its business at 1425 West Sunset 
Boulevard, St. George, Utah. 
B. Seller and Humphries desire that Seller sell, and 
Buyer purchase, substantially all of the assets of Seller, except 
the leasehold interest of Seller, as hereinafter detailed. 
C. Humphries desires to remain as the manager of the 
nursery business at the presently existing location under 
management contract with Buyer, to which the parties have agreed 
pursuant t :) a separate Employment Agreement related hereto. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and the 
•mutual covenants contained herein, it is hereby represented, 
agreed and covenanted between the parties as follows: 
1. Sub jec t of S a l e . The p r o p e r t y to be s o l d p u r s u a n t 
to t h i s Agreement ( c o l l e c t i v e l y r e f e r r e d to as the "Asse t s ' 1 
h e r e i n ) s h a l l c o n s i s t of s u b s t a n t i a l l y a l l of the A s s e t s of 
S e l l e r , i n c l u d i n g , wi thout l i m i t a t i o n : 
(a) Al l of the r i g h t s to the n u r s e r y b u s i n e s s 
p r e s e n t l y be long ing ' to S e l l e r , r i g h t s of a s s i g n m e n t of 
b u s i n e s s l i c e n s e s and o t h e r i n t a n g i b l e s r e l a t i n g 
t h e r e t o ; 
(b) The r i g h t to use the t r a d e name of "West S i ce 
Nursery" or any v a r i a t i o n t h e r e o f , for the e x c l u s i v e use 
of Buyer; 
(c) A l l pe r sona l p r o p e r t y be longing to S e l l e r and 
p e r t a i n i n g to the nu r se ry b u s i n e s s i n c l u d i n g a l l 
i n v e n t o r y on the premises of S e l l e r as of the d a t e h e r e -
of, t o g e t h e r with a l l t o o l s , equipment , m a c h i n e r y , motor 
v e h i c l e s and a l l appur t enances t h e r e t o as more f u l l y 
d e t a i l e d and scheduled on E x h i b i t A a t t a c h e d h e r e t o ; 
(d) Accounts r e c e i v a b l e he ld on the books a n d / o r 
be long ing to S e l l e r . 
In a d d i t i o n , i t has been agreed among the p a r t i e s t h a t 
S e l l e r s h a l l con t i nue to l ea se the p remises but s h a l l a l l o w Buyer 
t o o p e r a t e the b u s i n e s s to whatever e x t e n t i t deems a p p r o p r i a t e 
so long as the terms of the l e a s e a re no t v i o l a t e d by such u s e , 
2 . Terms of S a l e . S e l l e r w i l l s e l l t he A s s e t s 
p u r s u a n t to t h i s Agreement- and Buyer hereby pu rchase s t h e A s s e t s 
for t he amounts and payable for the fo l lowing c o n s i d e r a t i o n : • 
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(a) Buyer shall deliver to Seller, certain real 
estate located in Weber County, Utah, specifically 
described on the deeds attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
The original deeds transferring title to the property 
shall be executed and delivered as a part of -this Agree-
ment. Buyer warrants that title thereto is free and 
clear, subj€cflt to taxes which are unpaid and due for the 
year 19 8^^ In addition, Buyer shall provide at its own 
expense a policy of title insurance covering the value 
of the land conveyed, 
(b) Buyer shall contract with Humphries to provide 
management services on a contract basis as hereinafter 
set forth in the Contract for Management Services which 
is incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit C* 
(c) Seller shall assume all debts and obligations 
incurred by the business prior to the date of this 
Agreement. Seller represents that such debts and 
obligations are fully described on the attached Exhibit 
D • 
(d) All accounts receivable incurred by Seller 
and/or Humphries in connection with the operation of the 
business as described herein. A list of such accounts 
is attached hereto as Exhibit E. 
(e) Buyer shall not assume any liabilities or 
obligations of Seller and Humphries, and Seller and 
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Humphries hereby warrant and represent to Buyer neither 
of them shall have any remaining obligations due to 
creditors uoon closing of this transaction, except one 
o 
Promissory Note to Zionus m^rst National Bank in the ^r 
a-.ount cf $ /s> , CC<? -^ ^ vhlcfl^ 'shall be palcvtv-
by c ct 3 c. /<ttf c-/*^. and raiscel-aneoCis t race account of 
* ^ s * # - ,/!. 
to be assumed 
not more than $ 
Buyer• 
3 . -Trade Nrmes. By reason of the assignment to Bu : e : 
> ' 
hereunder the r ight to use the name "West Side Nursery" or any 
d e r i v a t i v e thereof, Se l l e r agrees not to use said names or v any 
names s imi la r thereto in connection with any other business 
engaged in by Buyer. Humphries makes the same covenant to the 
e x t e n t t ha t Humphries, in the fu tu re , may encage in any other 
b u s i n e s s . Se l le r furtner agrees tha t i t w i l l change i t s name in 
accordance with such laws in order to avoid any p o t e n t i a l 
c o n f l i c t with the business purchased by Buyer hereunder. 
4. Sales Taxes. Se l l e r agrees t h a t , without 
d iminishing the accounts r e c e i v a b l e , i t w i l l pay a l l Utah s t a t e 
s a l e s and use taxes due for a l l periods ending as of tne date 
hereof . Buyer wi l l be l i a b l e for a l l such taxes from and af te r 
such d a t e . 
5. Bulk Sales Compliance. Se l l e r agrees tha t as to 
any c r e d i t o r s of Sel ler who would not be paid in due course by 
Buyer pursuant to Paragraphs 1 and 2(a) hereof, Se l l e r has 
obtained waivers of the application of the Bulk Sales Act o£ the 
laws-of the State cf Utah or can establish an exemption from such 
law, and Seller will obtain an opinion of its counsel supporting 
the representations of this paragarph. 
6. Management. Pursuant to the Contract for 
.Management Services, Exhibit C, Buyer has agreed to contract 
Humphries', and Humphries has agreed to perform services, as the 
manager of the nursery business at 1425 West Sunset Boulevard, 
St. George, Utah, as set forth in the Contract for Management 
Services attached hereto as Exhibit C. Furthermore, both Seller 
and Humphries have agreed .u^ p iVficncompeti t ion covenant for a 
period of i •' ^ •^•rJ^===^^==^/ .after the termination of Humphries1 
contract covering the geographical service area of Buyer at the 
time of termination. In addition to contractual arrangements 
with Humphries, it is agreed that Buyer shall be responsible for 
employing and paying employees as may be necessary for the 
continued operation of the nursery business. However, Humphries 
shall be responsible for day-to-day supervision of Buyer's 
employees. 
7=5=^ —R-ep-ur chase-;— T n t-hp p'-^ nh of the ce-a t-h-
d i s o b i l i t y of Buyer w i t h i n a pe r iod of one v^a-r^lfrxjm the d a t e 
he reo f , S e l l e r s h a l l have the r i g h t ^ r O repurchase any and a l l of 
the r i g h t s conveyed herejwrfer for the then f a i r market va lue of 
the p r o p e r J ^ ^ r l T g i n a l l y t r a n s f e r e e by Buyer to S e l l e r as of the 
rf buuh death err Si^s-^i^-i-t-ys—pi :ig t-;]_e va lue of any 
i s sSoansGC—G-S- U» O O <Aiii V me—ca J ru u A. v-»-i -^  >^ 
Agreement, with interest accrued at the rate of f i f teea^oercen t 
(15%) per annum during the one-year period. Fai.^market value 
shall be established by appraisal of the property transferee by 
Buyer to Seller. Seller shall pay the^cost of such appraisal. 
In the event the parties are not in mutual agreement with the 
findings of the appraiser hire^by^Seller, then each shall select 
additional appraisers who shall theh^seiect an appraiser to 
perform an appraisal, the results of which shall be presumed to 
be the proper considerations for the repurchase. ?ocourposes of 
this seC/ticn, disability shall mean one hundred psj^cent 
rLi-S^Lu ! 1 i hy P. ^  r- P - h - f ; cj by ?_ r.9d ;- n "*• "* <* or u O r . 
Th-e—5_.n-ggn ' ~ g ropi^nVj^ c^a—px.o v i 5 i on—i s~-^ p^ i b j ect—to-
right of^any member of Buyer's immediate family to ta'^cver and 
continue the business in the place^of Buv^c^cad assume and 
perform all of the Buyer's obligations^dnder this Agreement and 
the Contract For Management Seprlces, Exhibit C, entered into 
simultaneously herewith^^rhe electTlon^by a member of Buyer's 
immediate family^to continue the business must^be^made in writing 
to Seller>^;ithin Ten (10) days of Seller's written request to 
S^v^TL'^Lu t i A b i C t ^ e — t i v e — g A p u m h j L ^ P p r n v i g i n n . q o f t h i s S 6 C ( - ! f , n , . 
8. Maintenance of Lease. Buyer shall, on or before the / 
19th day of each month, pay the amount due under Sellers rental 
Agreement with James La Vae Smith, dated February 23, 1985 D^US 
-6-
ten percent (10%). Seller shallmaintaln and keep the lease of 
the premises paid up and current at all times. In the event any 
Notice of Default is delivered to Seller, Seller shall deliver a 
copy of the same to Buyer and cure such default witnin Ten (10) 
days of such notice. In the event Seller fails to cure default 
within Ten (10) days, Buyer may, at his discretion make the lease 
payment in the Seller's stead and may, at his discretion, 
terminate the contract for Management services, Exhibit C. 
9. Representations of Seller. In addition to 
covenants and representations hereinabove stated, Seller hereby 
represents to Buyer as follows: 
(a) Seller is a Utah Limited Partnership duly 
organized and existing under the laws of the State of 
Utah with full power to enter into this Agreement and 
execute all documents pertaining hereto; 
(b) Seller has been duly authorized by its General 
Partner to sell substantially all of the Assets and 
otherwise carry out the terms of this Agreement and 
perform'its covenants hereunder; and 
(c) Seller has provided to Buyer ample opportunity 
to inspect the Assets sold hereunder together* with the 
books of account and other documents and records per-
taining thereto, and has no knowledge of any material 
obligations or contingent liabilities of Seller which 
would impact-this Agreement and which have not already 
been disclosed to Buyer or would be easily discoverable 
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by an examination of the books and recWds of Seller. 
10 . General. 
(a) It is expressly understood that Buyer assumes 
no indebtedness or obligation of any nature presently or 
at any time in the future owed to any creditor by Seller 
or Humphries; except as expressly set forth in this 
Agreement, and Buyer disclaims any intent that this 
Agreement or any document related hereto shall be 
construed to create benefits for any other such 
creditor. 
(b) This Agreement shall be governed by the laws 
of the State of Utah in its interpretation. 
(c) In the event of any legal action brought by 
either party for "the purpose of enforcing performance of 
any covenant or representation hereunder or for damages 
for breach thereof, the prevailing party shall be 
entitled to recover from the breaching party attorneys1 
fees and, costs as shall be determined by the Court. 
(d) • In the event any written notice is required 
under this Agreement, the parties shall agree to effect 
either personal delivery or delivery by U.S. mail, first 
class postage prepaid, addressed to the addresses 
opposite the signatures hereunder or any other address 
which either party may subsequently confirm in writing 
to the other. 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF# the parties hcA hereunto executed 
this Agreement effective as of the day and year first above 
written. 
WESTS IDE NURSERY, 
a Utah Limited Partnershlo 
Darrel Humphries, General Partner 
SELLER: 
Darrel Humphries \^  
0 
BUYER: 
I /^eorg^ Ronald Wright 7 
Al-20 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
PERSONAL PROPERTY OF SELLEF. 
/?LL 7>£AU7 HfirencU,Stcpp//e£, *"dprrj*UA/' ffirpperry AJCV £-xtcr/v? 
SQt- f~f>c kJcjt- J fee Asa rsetn. 
EXHIBIT "E" 
DEEDS TO OGDEN PROPERTY 
EXHIBIT "Dn 
SCHEDULE OF DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF SELLER 
(3) J9S« Trace r0Ab f „ ; j ^ ^ ^ U « / hr«* 
H J /4tZ vUr-CurXf {Pou^^e _ _ 
'ui /vrtve. 
?, ceo .«. 
_ •? oca 
« 
ADDENDUM B 
CONTRACT FOR MANAGEMENT SERVICES 
AGREEMENT made between DARR2L HUMPHRIES, of Veyo, Utah, 
County of Washington, State of Utah, ("Contractor") and GEORGE 
RONALD WRIGHT, whose principal place of business is located at 
City of St. George, County of- Washington, State of Utah, 
("Owner") . 
RECITALS 
1. Owner is engaged in the business of operating a 
plant nursery at wholesale and retail and related products, and 
maintains or will maintain an ongoing business in St. George, 
County of Washington, State of utah. 
2. Contractor has been engaged and ha.s had a great 
deal of experience in the above-designated business. 
3. Contractor is willing to perform services and Owner 
is willing to engage Contractor for management services on the 
terms, covenants, and conditions hereinafter set forth. 
4. Owner has pruchased the nursery from, among others, 
Contractor himself as of the date hereof. 
For the reasons set forth above, and in consideration of 
the mutual promises and agreements hereinafter set forth, Owner 
and Contractor agree as follows: 
app > 5 1988 
SECTION ONE 
TERMS OF PERFORMANCE 
Owner hereby engages Contractor as a manager of the West 
Side Nursery and Contractor hereby accepts and agrees to such 
engagement, subject to the general supervision and pursuant to 
the orders, advice, and direction of Owner. Contractor shall 
perform such other duties as are customarily performed by one 
holding such position in other, same, or similar business or 
enterprises as that engaged in by Owner, It is understood that 
Contractor is an independent proprietor and not an employee of 
Owner, 
SECTION TWO 
BEST EFFORTS OF CONTRACTOR 
Contractor agrees that he will at all times faithfully, 
industriously, and to the best of his ability, experience and 
talents, perform all of the duties that may be required of and 
from him pursuant to the express and implicit terms hereof, to 
the reasonable satisfaction of Owner. 
SECTION THREE 
TERM OF CONTRACT 
The term of this Agreement shall be a period of one (1) 
year, commencing ^S^TA^^A^S^^ ,1A/ , 1985, and terminating (¥-* V # > - . ^ . . . 
S^^etntrtrr , 198 (o ^ s u b j e c t , however, to p r i o r t e r m i n a t i o n 
as h e r e i n a f t e r provided. At the e x p i r a t i o n da te t h i s Agreement 
may be renewed for pe r iods of one year s u b j e c t to n e g o t i a t i o n and 
f u r t h e r agreement between the p a r t i e s . 
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SECTION FOUR 
COMPENSATION 
Owner shall pay Contractor, and Contractor shall accept 
%Tv,hc^s hereunder, 
compensation at^^ejrate of ^*3or PCtT^^^r ^Thousand Dollars 
(? ts50. C&£^^JJ y^ 'pfer year, payable twice monthly as of the 1st 
j 
and 15th day of each month while this Agreement shall be in 
force. 
Owner shall reimburse Contractor for all necessary 
expenses incurred by Contractor while traveling pursuanc to 
Owner!s directions. 
SECTION FIVE 
TERMINATION DUE TO DISCONTINUANCE OF BUSINESS 
Anything herein contained to the contrary notwithstand-
ing, in the event that Owner shall discontinue operating its 
business at St. George, State of Utah, then this Agreement shall 
terminate as of the last day of the month on which Owner ceases 
operations at such location with the same force and effect as if 
such last day of the month were originally set as the termination 
date hereof. 
SECTION SIX 
OTHER TIME OBLIGATIONS 
Contractor shall devote substantially all of his time, 
attention, knowledge, and skills solely to the business and 
interest of Owner, and Owner shall be entitled to all of the 
benefits, profits or other issues arising from or incident to all 
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work, services, and advice of Contractor, and Contractor shall 
not, during the term hereof, serve as officer, director, 
employee, or in any other capacity in any other business similar 
to Owner's business or any allied trade; provided, however, that 
nothing herein contained shall be deemed to prevent or limit the 
right of Contractor to manage personal and family investments 
thac do not compete with Owner's business, 
SECTION SEVEN 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING OPERATIONS 
Contractor shall make available to employer all informa-
tion of which Contractor shall have any knowledge and shall make 
all suggestions and recommendations that will be of mutual bene-
fit to Owner and himself, 
SECTION EIGHT 
TRADE SECRETS 
Contractor shall not at any time or in any manner, 
either directly or indirectly, divulge, disclose or communicate 
to any person, firm or corporation in any manner whatsoever any 
information concerning any matters affecting or relating to the 
business of Owner, including without limiting the generality of 
the foregoing, any of its customers, the prices it obtains or has 
obtained from the sale of, or at which it sells or has sold, its 
products, source of supply, or any other information concerning 
the business of Owner, its manner of operation, its plans, pro-
cesses, or other data without regard to whether all of the fore-
going matters will be deemed confidential, material, or impor-
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tant, the parties hereto stipulating that as between them, the 
same are important, material, and confidential and gravely affedt 
the effective and successful conduct of the business of Owner, 
and Owner's good will, and that any breach of the terms of this 
paragraph shall be a material breach of this Agreement. 
SECTION NINE 
AGREEMENTS OUTSIDE OF CONTRACT 
This contract contains the complete agreement concerning 
the arrangement between the parties and shall, as of the effec-
tive date hereof, supersede all other agreements between the 
parties. However, this contract shall be consistent with a Pur-
chase of Assets Agreement of even date herewith. The parties 
stipulate that neither of them has made any representation with 
respect to the subject matter cf this Agreement or any represent-
ations including the execution and delivery hereof except such 
representations as are specifically set forth herein and each of 
the parties hereto acknowledges that he or it has relied on its 
own judgment in entering into this Agreement. The parties hereto 
further acknowledge that any payments oS representations that may 
have heretofore been made by either of them to* the other are of 
no effect and that neither of them has relied thereon in connec-
tion with his or its dealings with the other. 
SECTION TEN 
MODIFICATION OF CONTRACT 
No waiver or modification of this Agreement or of any 
covenant, condition, or limitation herein contained shall be 
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valid unless in writing and duly executed by the party to be 
charged therewith and no evidence of any proceeding, arbitration, 
cr litigation between the parties hereto arising out of or 
affecting this Agreement, or the rights or obligations of the 
parties hereunder, unless such waiver or modification is in writ-
ing, duly executed as aforesaid, and the parties further agree 
that the provisions of this section may not be waived except as 
herein set forth. 
SECTION ELEVEN 
TERMINATION 
In the event of any violation by Contractor of any of 
the terms of this contract, Owner thereon may terminate this 
Management Agreement without notice and with pay only to the date 
of such -termination. It is further agreed that any breach or 
evasion of any of the terms of this contract by either party 
hereto will result in immediate and irreparable injury to the 
other party and will authorize recourse to injunction and/or 
specific performance as well as to all other legal or equitable 
remedies to which such injured party may be entitled hereunder. 
SECTION TWELVE 
NONCOMPETITION COVENANT 
Upon termination of this contract for cause or upon 
expiration hereof by its Utodrms//Contractor agrees that for a 
TWO ( 1* y£TAr$ p^Vf^K 
period of -^rs^j^^^Xr^. sJ aft-^ r the date of such termination he 
shall not compete with the nursery, gardening sales and/or plant 
sales, related business of Owner by serving in any competing 
-6-
proprietorship, partnership, corporation or otherwise, in the 
States of Utah, Nevada, Oregon or Arizona. Contractor acknow-
ledges that the restrictions above stated are reasonable. It is 
agreed between the parties that the consideration for the non-
competition covenant is the Agreement for Partial Purchase of 
Assets executed on the same date hereof, pursuant to which Owner 
purchased the personal property assets of West Side Nursery, the 
former business owned by Contractor in his capacity as General 
Partner. 
SECTION THIRTEEN 
SEVERABILITY 
All agreements and covenants contained herein are sever-
able, and in the event any of them shall be held to be invalid by 
any competent court, this contract shall be interpreted as if 
such invalid agreements or covenants were not contained herein. 
SECTION FOURTEEN 
CHOICE OF LAW 
It is the intention of the parties hereto that this 
Agreement and the performance hereunder and all suits and special 
proceedings hereunder be construed in accordance with and under 
and pursuant to the laws of the State of Utah. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto executed 
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t h i s con t r ac t effect ive as of_^eu&gS5ir , 1985. 
OWNER: 
^ / )/f!&/J- i^%U?y 
Ronald W r i g h t 
CONTRACTOR: 
D a r r e l H a r a p h r i e s A 
A l - 2 1 
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ADDENDUM C-1 

ADDENDUM C-2 

ADDENDUM D 
Timothy B. Anderson of 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
One South Main, Suite 300 
St. George, UT 84770 
Telephone: (801) 628-1627 
float<& JJU/»/>M'*L 
KX-"^ 
t*y IP***'*}"*^-
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE RONALD WRIGHT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WESTSIDE NURSERY, a Utah 
l i m i t e d p a r t n e r s h i p and 
DARREL HUMPHRIES, an 
i n d i v i d u a l , 
D e f e n d a n t s . 
—oooOooo 
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING 
ORDER AND ORDER TO 
SHOW CAUSE 
Civil No. PSZ-CS3 6> 
oooOooo 
The above entitled Court, having reviewed the plain-
tiff's Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Order 
to Show Cuase, and the Verified Complaint of Geroge Ronald 
Wright, now finds as follows: 
1. It appears from the Verified Complaint that plain-
tiff purchased from the defendants the business known as Westside 
Nursery on or about October 4, 1985, and that plaintiff has since 
that date purchased additional substantial plant materials and 
other personal property and placed these on the Westside Nursery 
business premises for resale to the public. 
2. It appears that the defendant Darrel Humphries has 
been in possession and control of the Westside Nursery with all 
of its property, books and accounts since the sale to the plain-
tiff, pursuant to a management contract between plaintiff and 
defendant. 
3. It appears that defendants now allege that the 
agreements of October 4, 1985, are rescinded and terminated. 
4. It appears, from the defendants' letters that 
defendants' assert an owership interest in all of the property 
which was purportedly sold to plaintiff on October 4, 1985. 
5. It appears from the defendants' letters, that defen-
dants intend to conduct the business at the Westside Nursery for 
their own account and benefit. 
6. It appears from the defendants' letters, that defen-
dants intend to assume control and ownership of plant material 
and other property purchased by plaintiff after the sale, and to 
remove from the busi^Hss presmises other property purchased by 
the plaintiff for resale and to deliver the same to plaintiffs 
personal residence. 
7. It appears that plaintiff alleges that defendant 
Humphries has assaulted and physically abused him and interferes 
with his person and conduct of his business. 
8. It appears that unless the defendants are restrained 
or prevented from selling, hypothecating, removing, altering or 
damaging the business, property and books, are restrained from 
entering into new debts or obligations in the business name, and 
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restrained from harassing and interfering with the plaintiff, 
that the plaintiff's business will suffer irreparable damage. 
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 
WHEREFORE, the Court enters its Temporary Restraining 
Order as follows: 
1. Defendants are hereby restrained from removing, 
selling, injuring, destroying, wasting, hypothecating or 
encumbering any of the personal or real property associated in 
any way with Westside Nursery, including motor vehicles, 
regardless of who purchased said property or brought it to the 
premises, except as such property may be sold to the public for 
fair consideration in the normal course of business* 
2. Defendants are hereby restrained from compromising, 
releasing, altering, or destroying any of the books or accounts 
of the Westside Nursery, except to reflect new transactions, and 
are restrained from incurring any debt or obligation in the name 
of plaintiff or Westside Nursery. 
3. Defendants are hereby restrained from entering the 
the plaintiff's personal residence. 
4. Defendants are hereby restrained from communicating 
with the plaintiff, except as reasonably necessary to conduct the 
business, or touching the person of the plaintiff, or otherwise 
harassing the plaintiff or interfering in the plaintiff's conduct 
of his business. 
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5. This Order is issued on the giving of security by 
plaintiffs in the form of a bond or undertaking supported by 
adequate and proper sureties in the sum of %f^ ( / \k~' 
for payment of costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered 
by the defendants if they have incurred or suffered damages hav-
ing been wrongfully enjoined or restrained, 
ISSUED this '^ / day of December, 1985, at the hour 
of ^ftfS P.M.. 
BY--IQE COURT / 
) / / / s 
*;/•&{4L,.i)({h/tY 
" J. HARLXN'BURNS 
DISTRICT COURT 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
The defendants are .Ordered to appear on the 2T? dav 
of [jjJJ^Ml/ , 198jj , at the hour of //'V M /T^-m., at 
the Hall of Justice, 220 North 200 East, St. George, Utah, and 
show cause, if any they have, why this Temporary Restraining 
Order should not become a preliminary injunction pending resolu-
tion of the issues on the.^ nejrlts. 
DATED this / / day of December, 1985. 
/ 
WRIGHTA 
'/A 
/ "J. HARLAM BURNS 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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ADDENDUM E 
/.. 
RESOLUTION OF THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS V_ . 
OF WEBEfi COUNTY, UTAH M*J-
WHEREAS, the publ ic heal th and welfare concerns of c i t i z e n s of Weber 
bounty d i c t a t e that i t i s necessary to impose a l imited moratorium on 
ievelopment of any property located within the boundaries of the Dintah 
i i g h l a n d s Water and Sewer Improvement D i s t r i c t . 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS RESOLVED AND ORDERED, pursuant to the authority of 
:he Weber County Commission granted under Otah Code Annotated Sect ions 17-5-35, 
I 7 - 5 - 4 9 , and 17-5-77 f that a l imi ted moratorium on the development Qf any 
)rcperty l oca ted w i t h i n the boundaries of the Dintah Highlands Water* and Sewer 
Improvement D i s t r i c t i s hereby implemented under the fol lowing terms unt i l an 
adequate, approved publ ic sewer system has been constructed and i s operat ional: ' , ^ 
1. ) As of the e f f e c t i v e date of t h i s moratorium, no new subdivis ions in y • 
;he Dintah Highlands Water and Sewer Improvement D i s t r i c t w i l l be approved. 
v < 0 Any proposed except ion to paragraph 1 must be approved by the Weber 
bounty Commission and be substant iated by a writ ten statement from the 
Feber^Morgan D i s t r i c t Health Department that the subdivis ion i s located in an 
irea where i t s development w i l l not contaminate, aggravate, depreciate , or i n 
my manner have a negat ive impact on present s o i l , groundwater, surface water, 
>r drainage c o n d i t i o n s i n the Dintah Highlands Water and Sewer Improvement 
) i s t r i c t . 
3 . Prior to the development of any individual l o t , including those 
.ocated i n e x i s t i n g subdiv i s ion , the developer must f i r s t obtain wr i t t en 
ipproval from the Weber-Morgan D i s t r i c t Health Department to ensure that: 
a? A currehETcomprehensive s o i l ^ a n d groundwater evaluat ion has been 
«. 
iade of the s i t e ; APR 2 5 W8o 
fToEFENDANT'S I •* rvuiniT I 
b. Soi l and groundwater condit ions are in f u l l compliance with a l l 
ate and l o c a l r u l e s , regu la t ions , codes and ordinances pertaining to 
d iv idua l wastewater d isposal systems; and 
c. The proposed development w i l l not contaminate, aggravate, 
tprec ia te , or i n any manner have a negative impact on present s o i l , 
^oundwater, surface water or drainage condit ions in the Dintah Highlands Water 
nd Sewer Improvement D i s t r i c t , 
d. I t i s contemplated that these l o t s w i l l be considered and approved 
r r e j e c t e d on an ind iv idua l , case-by-case bas i s . 
In the opinion of the Weber County Board of Commissioners, i t s i s 
lecessary that t h i s po l i cy go in to e f f e c t Immediately upon publ i ca t ion i n order 
;o preserve the heal th of the inhabitants of Weber County. 
PASSED AND ADOPTED by the Board of County Commissioners of Weber County, 
Utah a t a regular meeting thereof held on the / 3? day of GcZcJj^t^ , 
1985, 
BOARD OFjWfifel COUNTY IStfklSSIONERS 
WILLIAM BAILEY 
ATTEST: 
RICHARD GREENE 
By > 
DEftTtY CLERK ^ (J 
ADDENDUM F 
WASHINGTON COUNTY 
1 APR 29 1938 
•CTSZJ 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CIERX 
DEPUTY 
GEORGE RONALD WRIGHT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs • 
WESTSIDE NURSERY, a Utah 
limited partnership and 
DARREL HUMPHRIES, an 
individual, 
Defendant 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
Civil No. 85-0535 
We the jury, duly-empaneled in the above-entitled matter, 
find, by the agreement of at least six of our number: 
l.Did defendant Darrel Humphries breach the agreements 
between the narties by actions inconsistent with the terms of the 
agreements? YES \ NO 
2. If your answer to No. 1 is Yes, what damages should be 
awarded to Plaintiff George Ronald Wriaht as a result of tr--> br^?.ch? 
3. Did Plaintiff Ceorge Ponald Wright breach the agreements 
between the parties by terminating Defendant Darrell Humphries as an 
employee under the Management Agreement? YES A MO 
4. If your answer to No. 3 is Yes, what damages should be 
awarded to Defendant Darrel Humphries as a result of the breach? 
* /5^<r —-
5. Did Plaintiff George Ronald Wright breach the agreements 
in any other respect? YES X MO 
6. If your answer to No. 5 is Yes, what should he the amount 
of damages awarded to Defendant Darrel Humphries as a result of 
*• h a t b r e a c ^  ? * {(j {' 
7. Under the agreements, who was to pay the first $5,000 of 
the accounts payable as of October 4, 1985? 
PLAINTIFF X DEFENDANTS 
8. Under the agreements, who was to pay the accounts payable 
in excess of $5,000 as of October 4, 1985? 
PLAINTIFF DEFENDANTS X 
9. Under the agreements, who was to receive the accounts 
receivable owed to Westside Nursery as of October 4, 1985? 
PLAINTIFF X DEFENDANTS 
10. Under the terms of the agreements, between Plaintiff and 
Defendant Darrel Humphries, who is obligated to pay the Promissory 
Note in favor of Zions First National Rank in the sum of $15,000, 
plus accrued interest, dated January 3, 1985. 
PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT X 
11. As between Plaintiff and Defendant Darrel Humphries, who 
is obligated to pay the Promissory Note in favor of Zions First 
National Dank in the sun of $30,000, plus accrued interest, dated 
December 1985? 
PLAINTIFF X DEFENDANT 
12. Did Plaintiff George Ronald Wright make fraudulent 
misrepresentations concerning the value of the Weber County propert 
to defendants? YES A NO 
13. If your answer to question No. 12 is Yes, what amount o 
damages should be awarded to Defendants Westside Nursery and Darrel 
ruirrhries for the difference in the actual fair market value of the 
land in Weber County and the misrepresented value of that land? 
34. What is the amount of attorney's fee, if any, that 
should be awarded to: 
PLAINTIFF, GEORGE RONALD WRIGHT % /; 
DEFENDANTS - WESTSIDE NURSERY 
AMD DARREL HUMPHRIES % /{.d,U^ CC 
THE APOVE STATES THE OPINION OF THIS JURY. 
DATED this 2C/ day of It^-f^c (L- , 1980. 7f\> 
//, 
,1 
/ 
Foreperson 
•J 
DISSENTING JURORS 
By each answer number, list the names, if any, of the jurors 
dissenting from that answer: 
ANSWER 
NUMBER NAMES OF JURORS DISSENTING 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
-x. , _ . — ^ — — : 
1A. 
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HANS Q. CHAMBERLAIN [0607] 
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE 
Attorneys for Defendants 
250 South Main 
P. O. Box 726 
Telephone: (801) 586-4404 
'C3 T/J3 3 Fl'l 1 05 
DETU": . ^ <',-: <; 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE RONALD WRIGHT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
WESTSIDE NURSERY, a Utah 
limited partnership and 
DARREL HUMPHRIES, an 
individual, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT ON THE VERDICT 
Civil No. 85-0536 
The above-entitled matter came on for jury trial pursuant to 
notice duly given on April 25th, 1988, in the Washington County 
Courthouse before the Honorable J. Philip Eves, District Court 
Judge presiding. Present were Plaintiff George Ronald Wright, 
and his counsel, Gary Pendleton. Also present was Defendant 
Darrel Humphries, general partner in Westside Nursery, a Utah 
limited partnership and Darrel Humphries, an individual, and 
their counsel, Hans Q. Chamberlain. 
This matter has been the subject of prior orders which are 
affirmed in this Judgment. These orders include: 
1. Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause 
dated December 23rd, 1985. 
2. Temporary Restraining Order; Order Appointing Receiver; 
.A 
..,# i ^ A 
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Judgment; and Denial of Motion for Summary Judgment dated March 
25th, 1986. 
3.. Findings of Fact and Temporary Order dated July 2nd, 
1986. 
4. Findings and Order dated November 10th, 1986. 
The jury was empaneled and the parties proceeded to give 
opening statements. Plaintiff proceeded with the presentation of 
his case. Plaintiff rested. Defendants thereafter presented 
their case. 
After the Defendants rested their case pursuant to their 
counterclaim, Plaintiff moved for a dismissal or directed verdict 
against Defendants1 counterclaim alleging fraud. After hearing 
said argument, the same was denied by the Court. 
Following the order of the Court entered denying Plaintiff's 
motion to dismiss, the jury was called in and instructed. 
Arguments were made, and the matter was duly submitted to the 
jury. The jury returned a verdict as follows: 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
V7ASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE RONALD WRIGHT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WESTSIDE NURSERY, a Utah 
limited partnership and 
DARREL HUMPHRIES, an 
individual, 
Defendants. 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
Civil No. 85-0536 
1 
2 
3 
A 
8 
9 
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14 
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25 
We the jury, duly empaneled in the above-entitled matter, 
find, by the agreement of at least six of our number: 
1. Did Defendant Darrel Humphries breach the agreements 
between the parties by actions inconsistent with the terms of the 
agreements? 
YES X NO 
2. If your answer to No. 1 is Yes, what damages should be 
awarded to Plaintiff George Ronald Wright as a result of the 
breach? 
$ 6,805,00 
3. Did Plaintiff George Ronald Wright breach the agreements 
between the parties by terminating Defendant Darrel Humphries as 
an employee under the Management Agreement? 
YES X NO 
4. If your answer to No. 3 is Yes, what damages should be 
awarded to Defendant Darrel Humphries as a result of the breach? 
$ 15,000.00 
5. Did Plaintiff George Ronald Wright breach the agreements 
in any other respect? YES X NO 
6. If your answer to No. 5 is Yes, what should be the 
amount of damages awarded to Defendant Darrel Humphries as a 
result of that breach? $ 0 
7. Under the agreements, who was to pay the first $5,000 of 
the accounts payable as of October 4, 1985? 
PLAINTIFF X DEFENDANT 
3ERLAIN 
IGBEE 
VS AT LAW 
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8. Under the agreements, who was to pay the accounts 
payable in excess of $5,000 as of October 4, 1985? 
PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT X 
9. Under the agreements, who was to receive the accounts 
receivable owed to Westside Nursery as of October 4, 1985? 
PLAINTIFF X DEFENDANT 
10. Under the terms of the agreements, between Plaintiff and 
Defendant Darrel Humphries, who is obligated to pay the 
Promissory Note in favor of Zions First National Bank in the sum 
of $15,00C, plus accrued interest dated January 3, 1985. 
PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT X 
11. As between Plaintiff and Defendant Darrel Humphries, who 
is obligated to pay the Promissory Note in favor of Zions First 
National Bank in the sum of $30,000, plus accrued interest, dated 
December 1985? 
PLAINTIFF X DEFENDANT 
12. Did Plaintiff George Ronald Wright make fraudulent 
misrepresentations concerning the value of the Weber County 
property to Defendants? YES X NO 
13. If your answer to question No. 12 is Yes, what amount of 
damages should be awarded to Defendants Westside Nursery and 
Darrel Humphries for the difference in the actual fair market 
value of the land in Weber County and the misrepresented value of 
that land? $ 38,582.00 
14. What is the amount of attorney's fee, if any, that 
should be awarded to: 
A 
1 
2 
3 
PLAINTIFF GEORGE RONALD WRIGHT 
DEFENDANTS WESTSIDE NURSERY and 
DARREL HUMPHRIES $ 10,000.00 
THE ABOVE STATES THE OPINION OF THIS JURY. 
DATED this 30th day of April, 1988. 
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BOX 72S 
/s/ Clavton Prince 
Foreperson 
DISSENTING JURORS 
By each answer number, list the names, if any, of the jurors 
dissenting from that answer: 
ANSWER 
NUMBER 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
NAMES OF JURORS DISSENTING 
1 
2 
3 
4 
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10 
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11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
Vondell L. Barrick, Evon R. Seely 
The Court made some inquiry of the jury concerning specific 
findings. Neither counsel requested that the jury be polled 
after returning the verdict and the jury was then excused. 
NOW, THEREFORE, based upon the findings of the jury and upon 
applicable principles of law, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Defendant Humphries shall have and recover against 
Plaintiff Judgment in the amount of $20,198.21 computed as 
follows: 
A. Plaintiff is entitled to Judgment in the amount of 
$37,305.21 as reimbursement for funds borrowed from Zions 
First National Bank and deposited directly into the Westside 
Nursery checking account. Against this sum, Plaintiff is 
entitled to setoffs in the amount of $6,805.00 as 
reimbursement for monies misappropriated by Defendant 
Humphries from the Westside Nursery account for the payment 
of personal obligations and $6,772.00 as reimbursement for 
funds withdrawn from the Westside Nursery account after 
October 4th, 1985, for the purpose of paying accounts which 
should have been assumed and discharged by Defendants. The 
cimounts specified herein constituting Plaintiff's right of 
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25 
setoff also includes interest which has been calculated at 
the legal rate on the above-mentioned items from the date of 
the misappropriation or expenditure. 
2. Defendants Westside Nursery and Humphries are awarded 
Judgment against Plaintiff for the difference in the actual fair 
market value of the land in Weber County and the misrepresented 
value cf said land in the sum of $38,582.00. The damages awarded 
by the jury were calculated by the jury based on a fraudulent 
misrepresentation concerning the value of the Weber property to 
be $90,000.00, less the sum of $54,700.00 and less the real 
estate commission Westside Nursery and Humphries had to pay in 
selling the property of $3,282.00, thus totaling a difference of 
$38,582.00. Said Judgment shall bear interest at the rate of 
twelve percent (12%) per annum until paid in full. The Court 
will not award interest to Defendants on the sum of $38,582.00 
from and after October 4th, 198 5 until time of Judgment, even 
though requested to do so by Defendants. 
3. Plaintiff is not contractually bound to assume or 
indemnify Defendant Humphries against any obligation in favor of 
Zions First National Bank arising out of the execution of a 
certain Promissory Note dated January 3rd, 198 5. 
4 Defendants are obligated to pay and discharge all 
accounts payable as of October 4th, 1985, t.< the extent that said 
accounts exceeded the sum of $5,000.00 and are further obligated 
to pay all outstanding tax obligations, federal, state or local, 
accruing on or before October 4th, 1985. 
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5. Even though the jury found that Plaintiff breached the 
agreements between the parties by terminating Defendant Humphries 
as an employee under the Management Agreement and awarded 
Humphries damages in the sum of $15,000.00 by reason of the same, 
the Court concludes and orders that Defendant Humphries' claim 
for wrongful termination of the Management Agreement is dismissed 
with prejudice, the jury's findings regarding specific issues of 
fact establishing the defense of justification as a matter of 
law. 
6. Defendants Westside Nursery and Humphries are awarded 
Judgment against Plaintiff in the sum of $10,000.00 as and for 
attorneyfs fees incurred in the prosecution of this action. 
7. Defendants Humphries and Westside Nursery are therefore 
awarded a total Judgment against Plaintiff in the sum of 
$68,78 0.21, said Judgment to bear interest at the rate of twelve 
percent (12%) per annum until paid in full. 
DATED this V — day of , 1988 
&4S-C4— 
J/ PHILIP EVES 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
GARY "W. PraCLETON 
Attornev/xor PlaintL 
I HANS Q. CHAMBERLAIN Jvttorney for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the within and foregoing JUDGMENT ON THE VERDICT 
to Mr. Gary W. Pendleton, Attorney at Law, 150 North Second East, 
Suite 202, St. George, Utah 84770, first-class postage prepaid, 
on this 5th day of August, 1988. 
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ecretary -' 
. -£<?£*<' 
^ 
/
 / 
